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Abstract 
Within the last decade, the terrorist attacks by Boko Haram have been the topic of 
considerable scholarly focus; yet, there remains a lack of knowledge and understanding 
about the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government in 
Borno State. Using Wilner’s contemporary deterrence theory as the foundation, the 
purpose of this case study of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) was to bridge the gap in 
knowledge to understand the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the 
Nigerian government and to explore alternate approaches to the counterterrorism efforts 
in Borno State to deter Boko Haram. Data were collected through interviews with 10 
NPF counterterrorism experts selected through a purposive sampling strategy. These data 
were inductively coded and analyzed using Braun and Clarke’s thematic analysis 
procedure. Two primary themes emerged from this study: (a) counterterrorism measures 
used by the Nigerian government were ineffective and (b) the important distinctions in 
the perceptions of the participants. De-radicalization and reorientation measures hold the 
potent dynamics of an enduring and long-term approach to successful counterterrorism 
and combating insurgency. The results of this study have implications for positive social 
change including policy recommendations to the Nigerian government to invest in 
counterterrorism efforts rooted in trust-building at higher levels of government to reduce 
the impact of potential infiltration of Boko Haram in government as well as 
implementing education and outreach programs highlighting the ills of terrorism, making 
it less attractive for vulnerable youths, enthroning peace and normalcy in the community, 
and promoting a society devoid of the destructive tendencies of terrorism. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
The violence unleashed on the Nigerian populace by the Boko Haram extremist 
Islamist group is unprecedented in their target of innocent and unsuspecting individuals 
who the group considers as engaged in un-Islamic activities (Forest, 2012). Churches, 
Christians, Muslim clerics, strategic government agencies, and politicians have been the 
usual targets in the spate of attacks (Forest, 2012). Boko Haram wages war against all 
who have an affinity for Westernization, including Muslims  considered by the group to 
be un-Islamic and corrupt in their practices.  
In the wake of these attacks, Boko Haram engenders countrywide insecurities and 
increased tensions among ethno-religious groups. Due to these deadly acts of terror, Boko 
Haram has become the focus of national security concern (Oyewole, 2013). Systemic 
deficiencies in the political environment in Nigeria and failures by the Nigerian 
government to address the root causes and symptoms of terrorism have been cited as 
some of the issues that enable the insecurities engendered by the deadly acts of terror by 
Boko Haram to linger (Onah, 2014; Umar, 2013).  
The threat posed to the Nigerian government and citizens by Boko Haram has 
been debilitating in view of the extensive loss of lives and properties resulting from the 
indiscriminate terrorist attacks by the group. These attacks have created an atmosphere of 
civil siege and volatility, with critically dire implications for public peace, safety, and 
security (Okoli & Iortyer, 2014). Although the Nigerian government had employed 
various strategies to end the attacks by Boko Haram, such as hard politics, military 
mobilization (Oyewole, 2013), and an emphasis on repressive state security (Aghedo & 
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Osumah, 2012), these approaches have been inadequate deterrence against Boko Haram 
because of the government’s focus on militarized responses.  
My plan with this study was to conduct a case study of the Defence Intelligence 
Agency (DIA). The intent was to explore this real-world situation to better understand the 
government’s past responses and their effectiveness. As I will explain in Chapter 4, my 
plan changed, and I interviewed members of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) instead. I 
attempted to capture the perspectives of experts regarding alternative approaches, through 
interviews with 10 senior officials within the NPF, to the terrorist threat in Borno State, 
the base of Boko Haram operations.  
In this chapter, I present the background to the study, including information on  
the violent campaigns and insecurities engendered by the Boko Haram attacks, followed 
by a statement of the problem justifying the need for this study. Subsequently, I present 
the purpose of the study, with a view toward a better understanding of the reasons why 
previous efforts had failed. Next, I present the research questions that probed why the 
past approaches by the Nigerian government failed and what strategies offered more 
effective deterrence to Boko Haram’s attacks. The next section includes a brief overview 
of the theoretical framework that grounded this research effort, followed by a description 
of the nature of the study, definitions of key terms, assumptions, scope and delimitations, 
limitations, and significance of the study. 
Background of the Study 
The structural reasons, such as incompetent and corrupt government, indicated in 
the research literature as fueling the grievances of individuals and groups to thrive are 
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exacerbated by extreme poverty, unemployment, and limited political and socioeconomic 
opportunities in the community Boko Haram operates from (Forrest, 2012). There is a 
direct link between the poverty and dearth of development in the Northern states of 
Nigeria and the emergence of Boko Haram (Owolade, 2014). The group blames this 
situation on the corrupting influence of the West on the governance of the Northern states 
(Owolade, 2014). The economic, political, and religious frustrations of marginalized 
young Muslims in northeast Nigeria find expression in Boko Haram (Warner, 2012). 
Hence, for Boko Haram, an armed revolt presents a solution to the widening regional 
economic disparity between the ruling elites and the masses (Owolade, 2014). 
Boko Haram’s campaign of violent acts of terrorism drew the attention of the 
Nigerian public between 2002 and 2009, following repeated strikes that started at the 
headquarters of NPF in Borno State (Maiangwa, Uzodike, Whetho, & Onapajo, 2012). 
Mohammed Yusuf formed Boko Haram on the philosophy that Western civilization in all 
its ramifications runs contrary to the tenets of the faith in Islam (Maiangwa et al., 2012). 
Instilling Islamic education in the youth formed a fundamental goal and means for the 
group to safeguard the Islamic societies in the north and curb the excess influence of 
globalization (Mu’azu, 2011).  
A violent clash between the group and Nigerian Security Forces resulted in the 
killing of hundreds of Boko Haram members and, subsequently, the leader of the group, 
Mohammed Youssef, while in the custody of Nigerian Security Forces (Asfura-Heim & 
McQuaid, 2015). Boko Haram went underground, reconstructed itself, and reemerged as 
a violent extremist organization under a new and fanatical leadership (Asfura-Heim & 
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McQuaid, 2015, p. 21). The killing of its members by the Nigerian Security Forces 
triggered an escalation of brutal terrorist violence by Boko Haram in retaliation (Asfura-
Heim & McQuaid, 2015). Boko Haram’s indiscriminate killing of innocent and 
unsuspecting people drew violent responses from the Nigerian Security Forces (Asfura-
Heim & McQuaid, 2015). The Nigerian Security Forces believed these responses to be 
the best approach to decimate Boko Haram and stop further attacks (Asfura-Heim & 
McQuaid, 2015). The Nigerian Security Forces apparently did not contemplate or expect 
the resurgence by the remnants of the group under a fanatical leadership with fortified 
membership or the brutality that defined their increasing attacks (Asfura-Heim & 
McQuaid, 2015). The group failed to capitulate to the Nigerian state despite the existence 
of a state of emergency in three states and heavy militarization of the North East 
geographical zone (Gilbert, 2014). These events point to a lack of effectiveness of the 
measures implemented by the Nigerian government to confront Boko Haram. 
The response of the Nigerian government to the violent campaign by Boko Haram 
has shown a dominance of hard politics and military mobilization (Oyewole, 2013). The 
Nigerian government had also placed emphasis on a repressive state security approach 
(Aghedo & Osumah, 2012). Further, Asfura-Heim and McQuaid (2015) argued that these 
approaches have perpetuated the conflict rather than abating it.  
The government responses have failed to yield the desired result of beating back 
Boko Haram. Instead, these government approaches highlight the governance vacuum 
and crisis of paying diminutive attention to the contextual realities and root political, 
social, and economic causes underlying the emergence and sustenance of the Boko 
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Haram conflict (Asfura-Heim & McQuaid, 2015). Consequently, the efforts have 
diminished the trust of the Nigerian people in the government to ensure not only the 
security of the state, but also human security, casting doubts on the legitimacy of the 
government (Asfura-Heim & McQuaid, 2015). The complexity of efforts to curtail acts of 
terrorism by Boko Haram is compounded by the wide spread of corruption and weakness 
of state institutions prevalent in Nigeria (Forrest, 2012). 
These issues indicate a grave erosion of the legitimacy of the Nigerian 
government by the failure of government’s efforts to contain Boko Haram. Okoro (2014) 
opined that a remedial strategy to avoid further enabling such resistance must employ 
transparent governance, concurrent with development. Against this backdrop, I conducted 
a case study of the NPF concerning Boko Haram’s activities.  
Violent insurgent campaigns by various groups agitating for specific grievances 
are not strange in Nigeria. However, Akpan, Ekanem, and Olofu-Adeoye (2014) noted 
that Boko Haram’s classification as a terrorist organization by the United States and its 
allies is the first of its kind for an insurgent group in Nigeria. This classification stems 
from Boko Haram’s use of sophisticated tactics and unprecedented lethality in its deadly 
campaign (Akpan, Ekanem, & Olofu-Adeoye, 2014). 
Onah (2014) stated that the persistence of systemic deficiencies in the political 
system in Nigeria, which engenders such realities as corruption, poverty, and 
underdevelopment, only fosters the kind of violence perpetrated by Boko Haram. Onah 
further asserted that such violence often only provokes counterviolence from the 
government and leads to unhindered domination and exploitation of the society without 
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addressing the issues. In a related study, Umar (2013) opined that the government’s 
current response has been inadequate to address the symptoms of terrorism. The author 
contended that a more enduring and adequate response by the government should involve 
a strategy that targets the root causes and symptoms of terrorism (Umar, 2013). On the 
other hand, Onuoha (2012) argued that the increasing capacity of Boko Haram to execute 
low-scale and lone attacks as well as the attendant safety challenges demand the attention 
of the security forces in Nigeria and possibly the global community to eliminate the 
potential for transnational terrorism. Uzodike and Maiangwa (2012) asserted that the 
failures of government intelligence and security apparatus exacerbate the security 
conditions created by the Boko Haram attacks. 
The scope and size of attacks by Boko Haram grew such that by 2012, they had 
been responsible for numerous attacks against the military, police, government, and 
media organizations, resulting in the death of hundreds of people (Uzodike & Maiangwa, 
2012). Members of the group abducted and killed Christians who constitute a minority in 
northeastern Nigeria, and they attacked churches (Uzodike & Maiangwa, 2012). The 
general insecurity created by the unabated uprising is a consequence of the failure of 
governance and institutional fragility, according to Aghedo and Osumah (2012). 
Similarly, Soyinka (2012) noted that the insecurities across the country following the 
production of these foot soldiers in mass, who have been deliberately bred, nurtured, 
sheltered, and ordered to unleash violence largely at the society, has been facilitated by 
economic factors.  
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Recommendations based on the findings of my study have important implications 
for positive social change for residents of the communities in Borno State to minimize or 
eliminate the unrest in their communities and restore peace to their daily lives. 
Recommendations from my study may enable the security agencies to learn, adapt, and 
respond more quickly to the plots of Boko Haram to stage future attacks, enabling the 
government security agencies to be more effective in their counterterrorism efforts. 
In Chapter 2, I will show that there has been much discussion and research on the 
threat of terrorist attacks by Boko Haram in Nigeria as well as the measures taken by the 
government to counter the attacks. However, a gap still exists in research and 
understanding about the reasons why previous efforts by the Nigerian government in 
Borno State have failed to eradicate the threat posed by Boko Haram and consideration of 
alternative approaches for counterterrorism efforts by the Nigerian government in Borno 
State. I addressed this gap by conducting this qualitative case study. 
Problem Statement 
Within the last decade, the terrorist attacks by Boko Haram have informed 
considerable scholarly focus, from exploring the root causes of terrorism and the 
attendant threats to security, to implicating Islam and citing the fragility of state 
institutions as contributing to the emergence of terrorism, as well as attributing it to the 
governance crisis. What remains unknown and a gap in the scholarly research led to the 
research problem for this study—a  lack of knowledge and understanding about the 
causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government in Borno State 
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and the reasons why alternate approaches were either considered and not used or not 
considered at all.  
The ongoing pursuit of effective counterterrorism measures against the campaign 
of terror attacks by Boko Haram constitutes an urgent national security objective that I 
sought to assist with this study. My research explored the governance and 
counterterrorism crisis of the Nigerian State, why the government through the NPF had 
been unable to reverse the terrorist trend, and if and why the Nigerian government has 
failed to consider alternative strategies for counterterrorism that could potentially 
enhance the deterrence of future acts of terrorism by Boko Haram in Borno State.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to bridge the gap in knowledge by 
conducting interviews with 10 senior government officials in the NPF to understand the 
causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government and to explore 
alternate approaches to the counterterrorism efforts in Borno State. With the knowledge 
and understanding gained from my research, I described and explained why previous 
attempts by the Nigerian government to deter Boko Haram were unsuccessful and 
provided the Nigerian government with a set of recommendations which, when 
implemented, may help the government to deter Boko Haram.  
Research Questions 
The following research questions guided this qualitative case study:  
RQ1: What have been the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the 
Nigerian government in Borno State?   
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RQ2: Were alternative approaches considered and not used or not considered at 
all? 
Theoretical Foundation 
The contemporary deterrence theory by Wilner (2015) served as the theoretical 
framework for this study. I briefly overview the theory in this section and will provide a 
more detailed explanation in Chapter 2. In contemporary times, deterring terrorist attacks 
is still a fundamental challenge to international security, and Nigeria is no exception; 
hence, I attempted to suggest aspects of the contemporary deterrence theory to apply in 
solving the problem of terrorism in Nigeria. There has been a revitalization of deterrence 
theory in contemporary research after nearly two decades of obscurity since the end of 
the Cold War. This resurgence has incorporated a mixture of substate and nonstate 
security concerns, like insurgency, terrorism, radicalization, organized transnational 
crime, cyber insecurity, and piracy (Wilner, 2015).  
There has been an addition to the deterrence agenda of more traditional interstate 
security dilemmas, stemming from reprobate organizations, nuclear and missile 
proliferation, and recent advances in missile technology and defense. Strategies like 
punishment; denial; delegitimization; dissuasion; inducements; and concepts, such as 
extended deterrence and cumulative deterrence, are being examined in new and exciting 
ways (Wilner, 2015).  
The suspicion about deterrence that started in the early 1990s through the 2001 al-
Qa’eda attack on the United States has started to dissipate. It has rather morphed into a 
community of scholars and practitioners who have partnered to investigate ways to 
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develop and apply deterrence theory as a strategic tool for addressing emerging and 
evolving security situations (Wilner, 2015). The effort to expand the scholarship and 
application of deterrence comes with potential risks of the rate at which the theory is 
evolving and the inevitable consequences of diluting and complicating their 
implementation (Wilner, 2015).  
There may be a need for a doctrinal change as well as a shift in approach by the 
Nigerian government in its counterterrorism measures, germane to effectively countering 
the terrorism by Boko Haram in Borno State. These campaigns of terror by Boko Haram 
continue without showing any sign of abatement despite measures employed so far by the 
government to stop further deadly attacks. To determine if a change in approach is 
warranted, it is essential to consider past approaches, successes, and failures in light of 
Wilner’s construct of contemporary deterrence. 
Nature of the Study 
In this study, I employed the qualitative case study design to explore the causes of 
failure of counterterrorism measures by the government against Boko Haram in Borno 
State. The aim was to deliver a thick and rich description of this phenomenon of interest 
and provide illumination and understanding in answering the humanistic why and how 
questions in response to the research questions (see Yin, 2013). The qualitative case 
study design was appropriate in this regard because it enabled an in-depth exploration of 
the NPF as a bounded case with careful attention to detail, context, and nuance (see 
Patton, 2002).  
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I explored a range of alternative approaches to help the Nigerian government 
deter terrorist activities by Boko Haram in Borno State. I collected data for this study 
using semistructured interviews. Ten interview questions (see Appendix D) were 
developed to answer the research questions relating to the causes of failure in 
counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government in Borno State and whether 
alternative approaches were considered and used in the fight against terrorism by the 
NPF. The outcome of these interviews highlighted the factors that are contributing to the 
increase in terrorist activities by Boko Haram. Based on the findings, I identified 
alternate strategies that may aid the Nigerian government in deterring future attacks.  
Based on the location and availability of the participants in Nigeria as well as 
considerations for cost, I planned with my gatekeeper at the NPF to conduct a face-to-
face interview in Nigeria with each participant within a period of 1 month. Data analysis 
consisted of thematic analysis of the responses collected from the in-depth, open-ended 
interviews. Generation of the codes and collation of the codes into themes and categories 
were done manually as well as with NVivo for a complete immersion into the data. The 
nature of the study is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3.  
Definitions  
Al-Qaeda: Arabic for “the Base.” An international terrorist network founded by 
Osama bin Laden in the late 1980s that seeks to rid Muslim countries of what it sees as 
the profane influence of the West and replace their governments with fundamentalist 
Islamic regimes (Council on Foreign Relations, 2012).  
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Boko Haram: This is the name generally used for the sect, Jama’atu Ahlis Suna 
Lidda’awati Wal Jihad, which translates to forbid everything Western and Western 
education or Western education is a sin (Adegbulu, 2013, Amusan & Oyewole, 2014, 
Oyewole, 2013). An extremist Islamist group that has carried out deadly campaigns of 
violence against innocent civilians in Nigeria since 2002. It also targets government 
establishments, churches, Christians and Muslim clerics, strategic government agencies, 
and politicians (Adegbulu, 2013, Amusan & Oyewole, 2014, Oyewole, 2013). 
Counterterrorism: A rival political strategy to the political goals terrorism seeks 
to achieve that involves an obligation to maintain and restore order from the disorder 
created by terrorism (Oyewole, 2013). 
Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA): The agency primarily responsible for military 
intelligence outside and inside Nigeria. Established in June 1986 by Decree # 19 to 
provide a system of obtaining military intelligence efficiently for the Nigerian Armed 
Forces and Ministry of Defence (Defence Intelligence Agency, n.d).  
Deterrence theory: A strategy of deterrence of general war that encompasses 
conceptions of national security opposed to preventive war, preemptive attack, and 
massive retaliation (Brodie, 1959). 
Joint Task Force (JTF): A special joint military task force established in June 
2011, by the Federal Government of Nigeria, specifically to tackle the crisis of Boko 
Haram in the north. It is comprised of the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy, Nigerian 
Airforce, Nigerian Police, and the Department of State Security Service (SSS) 
(Beegeagle, 2011, June 30).  
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Maitatsine: The Maitatsine riots were a series of violent uprisings instigated by 
Islamist militants in northern Nigeria between 1980 and 1985 and represented northern 
Nigeria’s first major wave of religiously inspired violence. The riots prompted immense 
ethnoreligious discord between Muslims and Christians in years to come. The Maitatsine 
movement was led by Muhammadu Marwa (d. 1980), a Cameroonian residing in Kano 
who opposed the Nigerian state (Maitatsine is a Hausa term for “He who damns,” 
referring to Marwa). He referred to himself as a prophet—to the extent that one account 
reports that some of his followers referred to Marwa in lieu of the Prophet Muhammad as 
God’s prophet and a reformer (mujaddid), with reference to Usman Dan Fodio. He was 
also notable for his vociferous condemnation of Western culture, education, and 
technology, and Marwa was known to refer to anyone who sent their children to a state 
school as an infidel, which is echoed in the contemporary Boko Haram movement   
National Intelligence Agency: The agency responsible for external intelligence 
and counterintelligence in Nigeria. It was established by Decree #19 in June 1986 
(National Intelligence Agency, 2012).  
Nigeria Police Force (NPF): The principal law enforcement agency in Nigeria, 
founded in 1930 under the Ministry of Interior (Nigeria Police Force, n.d).  
Shari’a: In its Islamic context, Sharia may be defined as the totality of God’s 
commands and exhortations, intended to regulate all aspects of human conduct and guide 
believers on the path of eternal salvation. The original sources of Sharia are the Koran 
and the Hadith. The Koran is the collection of the utterances believed by Muslims to be 
the literal words of God transmitted to the prophet Mohammed through the Angel 
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Gabriel. These utterances, consisting of more than 6,000 verses, were collected shortly 
after the death of the Prophet Mohammed in 632 A.D. and organized into 114 chapters in 
a single book, the Koran, which is accepted by all Muslims as the authentic Holy Book of 
the religion. The Hadith is the collection of the Sunna, or traditions of the Prophet 
Mohammed, consisting of his deeds and sayings that are believed by Muslims to have 
been inspired by God and to, therefore, have the same original value in expressing the 
divine Will of God as the Koran (Library of  Congress, 2011). 
State Security Service: This agency, also known as the Department of State 
Security, was established by Decree #19 in June 1986 and is responsible for domestic 
intelligence in Nigeria. Its mission includes defending and protecting the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria against domestic threats and the evolving security threats, including 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency (State Security Service, 2013). 
Terrorism: The term faces a lot of definitional challenges due to a lack of 
consensus among scholars on a generally accepted definition of terrorism. The two 
definitions adopted as working definitions for this study were (a) the use of force or 
violence or the threat of force or violence to change the behavior of a whole society by 
causing fear and by targeting specific parts of society to affect the entire society 
(Garrison, 2004, 278) and (b) the intentional random murder of defenseless 
noncombatants with the intention of instilling fear or mortal danger among civilians as a 
strategy designed to advance political ends (Meisels, 2009, p. 348).  
Assumptions 
I made the following assumptions in this study: 
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  The interviews effectively explored what had been the causes of failures of 
counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government in Borno State.  
 The senior government officials in the NPF were willing to take part in this 
study because of the continuing threat of terrorism in Nigeria and the 
significance of devising effective ways to deter it. 
 The participants understood and interpreted the in-depth interview questions 
accurately as worded. 
 The participants shared their views about the questions asked, openly and 
honestly in answering the interview questions. 
 The results of this study may lead to positive social change for the Nigerian 
communities and more specifically communities in Borno State under the 
siege of terrorist threats. 
Scope and Delimitations 
In this study, I interviewed 10 senior government officials in the NPF to explore 
the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government in Borno 
State and whether alternative approaches were considered and not used or not considered 
at all in the counterterrorism efforts by Nigerian government in Borno State. Therefore, 
the scope of this study excluded government officials from other security agencies in 
Nigeria. This limited the boundaries of this study to data that were generated from senior 
government officials in the NPF.  
This study excluded individuals I may have had remote or personal relationships 
with. These included friends, coworkers of friends, professional associates, family 
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members, and personal associates connected with the NPF. This exclusion prevented any 
feelings of coercion to participate in the study due to relationships that exist between us 
or relationships expected to exist. Consequently, it helped to ensure an objective and 
unbiased approach to the data that were generated. 
Limitations 
There were several limitations to the generalizability and trustworthiness of the 
findings of this study. The use of the case study research design with a purposive 
sampling of 15 senior government officials within the NPF, with an expectation of 
interviewing 10 participants, was the first of these limitations because that sample size 
may be judged by some to be too small to achieve informational saturation. The fact that 
the data involved the unique perspectives of the participants working in the NPF, which 
were analyzed to extract emerging codes and themes for reporting my research, implies 
that there is a limitation to generalizing the results of these unique perspectives, beyond 
participants in this study or similar populations. 
The second limitation pertains to the fact that participants were drawn from a 
specific agency involved in the fight against terrorism. This implied that their knowledge 
of terrorism based on their experiences might differ from other security agencies, which 
may have influenced their responses to the questions. A third limitation related to the fact 
that deterrence is merely one possibility among many within a broader counterterrorism 
policy and not a comprehensive solution by itself. A fourth limitation related to the 
location of participants in Nigeria. I had limited opportunity due to cost to travel to 
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Nigeria again to ask more probing, follow-up questions to clarify or to probe more deeply 
into their responses.  
The final limitation related to bias and my assumption that participants shared 
their responses by answering the questions honestly and openly. There was a possibility 
of social desirability bias, which arises when participants choose to self-report in a 
positive but dishonest manner, so others may look at them in a good way. I found, 
however, that the participants were open and honest in answering the questions.  
Significance of the Study 
There has been much discussion and research on the threat of terrorist attacks by 
Boko Haram in Nigeria as well as on the measures employed by the government to 
counter the attacks, including reasons why such government measures have been 
ineffective. However, research is sparse on alternative measures that could enhance the 
efforts of the Nigerian government to deter terrorism in Nigeria, particularly concerning 
Boko Haram’s activities in Borno State. Therefore, while it is important to note that the 
opportunity the Boko Haram group had to thrive unrestrained and beyond control stems 
from the ineptitude of the Nigerian state (see Onapajo & Uzodike 2012), it is also 
pertinent to explore alternative measures that can enhance deterrence through efforts by 
the Nigerian government. 
The results of this study have implications for social change through the potential 
to positively impact public policy, administration, and internal and external security 
management within many agencies in Nigeria, especially policymakers involved in 
counterterrorism in Nigeria and government security agencies, to assist in formulating 
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and implementing more effective counterterrorism measures that enhance deterrence. The 
findings of this study also have the potential to help eliminate or minimize the social 
unrest caused by Boko Haram’s terrorist activities and restore peace and normalcy to the 
daily lives of the communities of Borno State affected by this unrest. My research led to 
the recommendation of new strategies that may help the counterterrorist officials in 
Nigeria to deter terrorism. Other Nigerian security agencies that stand to benefit from this 
improvement besides the NPF include the SSS, National Intelligence Agency, and the 
DIA. In addition, the implications of this study are also relevant for the JTF, which is 
made up of the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy, Nigerian Airforce, and Nigerian Police.  
The findings and recommendations from my research may help in the 
performance of counterterrorism by security agencies in Nigeria through the 
implementation of strategies that deter terrorist attacks by Boko Haram. The 
recommended strategies could translate to enduring deterrence in efforts towards the 
pursuit of effective counterterrorism by the Nigerian government in combating the threat 
of terrorism by Boko Haram in Borno State. This may result in restoring confidence in 
security that has been considerably diminished or eroded completely by the recurrent 
terrorist activities as well as boost in credibility to the capacity of the Nigerian 
government to protect its citizenry and deter acts of terrorism.  
Summary and Transition 
The results of this qualitative case study filled the gap in knowledge of the NPF 
through interviews with 10 senior government officials in the NPF to understand the 
causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government. In addition, I 
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explored alternate approaches to deter terrorism through the efforts by the government to 
confront and ameliorate the terroristic threat from Boko Haram in Borno State.  
To ground this qualitative case study, Wilner’s (2015) construct of contemporary 
deterrence theory served as the theoretical framework. In-depth, semistructured 
interviews served as the main data collection instrument for this study. I conducted a 
face-to-face interview with participants in Nigeria within a period of 1 month. This study 
is significant because of its implications for the Nigerian security agencies, including the 
recommendation of more effective strategies to achieve deterrence. The 
recommendations from this research may aid collaboration among security agencies to 
detect and deter terrorist plots and enhance prompt and effective counterterrorism 
responses. 
Chapter 1 included the background of the problem, statement of the problem, 
purpose of the study, research questions, theoretical framework, nature of the study, 
definitions of terms, assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations of the study, 
significance of the study, and summary. Chapter 2 will include the strategy for literature 
search, theoretical foundation, overview of terrorism and counterterrorism, governance 
and crisis in Nigeria, an overview of fundamentalist uprisings and insurgencies in 
Nigeria, an overview of internal insecurities in Nigeria, responses of the Nigerian 
government to terrorism, as well as a summary and conclusions.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to fill the gap in knowledge by 
conducting interviews with 10 senior government officials in the NPF to understand the 
causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government and to explore 
alternate approaches to the counterterrorism efforts in Borno State. The Boko Haram 
extremist Islamist group unleashed a campaign of violence on the Nigerian populace on a 
scale unprecedented in its target of innocent and unsuspecting individuals that the group 
consider as engaged in un-Islamic activities (Forest, 2012). Not spared in the spate of 
attacks are churches, Christians, Muslim clerics, strategic government agencies, and 
politicians (Forest, 2012). While Boko Haram’s rationale for its attacks on these groups 
may be understandable, its justification for striking at Muslim clerics is still confounding. 
Owolade (2014) contended that this indicates a politically driven Islamism by Boko 
Haram, to wage war against all, including Muslims, who are aligned with Westernization. 
Faith-based Islam is a central theme in the campaign by Boko Haram, even though it does 
not form a paramount inspiration for the activities of the group (Owolade, 2014). This 
study highlighted the fact that religious affiliation does not play any role in Boko 
Haram’s choice of targets, such choices are predicated upon whether the targets are un-
Islamic and corrupt in discharging their primary official duties.  
Boko Haram engenders country-wide insecurities and increased tensions among 
ethno-religious groups in the wake of these attacks. The deadly acts of terror have made 
Boko Haram the focus of national security concerns (Oyewole, 2013). Consequently, the 
United States and its allies classified Boko Haram as a terrorist organization, the first 
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insurgent group in Nigeria to get such classification (Akpan et al., 2014). Issues such as 
systemic deficiencies in the political environment in Nigeria and failures by the Nigerian 
government to address the root causes and symptoms of terrorism tend to stimulate Boko 
Haram’s agenda (Onah, 2014; Umar, 2013).  
Incompetent and corrupt governments inhibit the welfare of the citizenry and lead 
to extreme poverty, unemployment, and limited political and socioeconomic 
opportunities in the communities in which Boko Haram operates (Forrest, 2012). 
Owolade (2014) linked the emergence of Boko Haram directly to the poverty and dearth 
of development in the Northern states of Nigeria. Boko Haram blames this situation on 
the corrupting influence of the West on the governance of the Northern states (Owolade, 
2014). The group perceives that an armed revolt presents a solution to the widening 
regional economic disparity between the ruling elites and ordinary citizens (Owolade, 
2014).  
In view of past efforts by the Nigerian government to contain militant threats, 
Akpan et al. (2014) examined the processes employed by the government in containing 
militant threats and argued against replicating the methods used with the Niger Delta 
militant groups in handling Boko Haram because of differences in their ideologies and 
core demands. Freeman (2014) argued that the killing of terrorist leaders in expectation 
of a natural consequence of the collapse of the terrorist organization have yielded mixed 
results. Boko Haram’s attacks and the security ramifications of Nigeria’s difficulties in 
defeating it have increased the need for more effective counterstrategies (Folade, 2016). 
This points to a failure of the approaches employed by the government to yield the 
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desired result of beating back Boko Haram. Hence, there is a need to fill the gap in 
knowledge through a case study of the NPF to understand the causes of failure in 
counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government and to explore alternate 
approaches to deter terrorism from Boko Haram in Borno State.  
Chapter 2 begins with a discussion of the literature search strategy employed in 
finding resources for this research. I explain the theoretical foundation that grounded this 
research effort, discuss terrorism and counterterrorism in Nigeria, and present an 
overview of Islamic religious uprisings in Nigeria. I also highlight internal insecurities in 
the wake of the Islamic fundamentalist uprisings, illuminate the Nigerian government’s 
responses to Islamic fundamentalist insurgencies, analyze ethno-religious tensions in 
Northern Nigeria, and explain the governance crisis that impacted counterterrorism 
measures by the Nigerian government.  
Literature Search Strategy 
To locate relevant literature for this study, I performed an in-depth search of the 
Walden University Library research databases covering all the EBSCO databases, such as 
the Thoreau Multi-Database Search, Academic Search Complete, SAGE Premier, as well 
as ProQuest Central and Dissertations. Additionally, I retrieved relevant literature from 
the International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center; websites of relevant 
organizations, such as the U.S. Homeland Security Digital Library, Military and 
Government Collection, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism; Dictionaries; and Google Scholar. These websites were perused with a 
focus on retrieving peer-reviewed journals within 5 years of publication. However, 
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extending the literature search beyond 5 years was necessary for an overview of 
fundamentalist Islamic religious uprisings witnessed at various points in time in Nigeria. 
Search terms included governance crisis and Nigeria, terrorism, counter-terrorism and 
Nigeria, fundamentalist Islamic religious uprisings and insurgencies in Nigeria, Boko 
Haram uprising, national security and Nigeria, corruption, security, and Nigeria, law 
enforcement, communication and Nigeria, contemporary deterrence and applications, 
general deterrence and rivals, rational deterrence, and nonstate actors. 
Theoretical Foundation 
This section of the literature review is organized in subsections on deterrence 
theory, early classical philosophers of deterrence theory, Wilner’s contemporary 
deterrence theory, and research applications of deterrence theory. 
Deterrence Theory 
There are two main branches of the deterrence theory: (a) general deterrence, 
which is designed to prevent crime in the general population; and (b) specific deterrence, 
which aims to discourage the individual offender from future criminal offenses (Morgan, 
2017). An important element of general deterrence is its broad scope. The state’s 
punishment of offenders, in the form of the death penalty and corporal punishment, 
serves as an example for others in the general population who have not yet taken part in 
criminal events (Morgan, 2017). Corporal punishment is outlawed in the United States 
and England, even though in the past lynching used to be carried out in public and family 
members of the offenders could attend so that they would see what happened to those 
who broke the law (Morgan, 2017). Corporal punishment is a common deterrence 
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strategy in other countries (Dilulio, 2010). In August 2001, Nigeria introduced shari’a, or 
Islamic law, that legalized corporal punishment (DiIulio, 2010). Iran sentenced 20 people 
to be caned for consuming alcohol in that same month, and in November 2001, Saudi 
Arabia subjected 55 people to be lashed for harassing women (Dilulio, 2010). Human 
Rights Watch reported that Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq sentenced violators to 
punishments in the form of amputation of arms, legs, and ears (DiIulio, 2010). Specific 
deterrence has a narrower scope in that it imposes severe punishment on the individual 
offender to discourage them from committing that offense in the future (Dilulio, 2010).  
Early Classical Philosophers of Deterrence Theory  
The deterrence theory of punishment trails back to the early works of classical 
philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes (1588–1678), Cesare Beccaria (1738–1794), and 
Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832). These social contract theorists contested the legal policies 
that had subjugated European thought for centuries and the mystical justifications on 
which they were established (Hobbes, 1651). These theorists also postulated the 
foundation for modern deterrence theory in criminology. In Leviathan, Hobbes (1651) 
described men as creatures of their own volition who want material gain, personal safety, 
and social reputation and may resort to conflict and resistance when their self-interests 
are threatened, usually by the government.  
To avoid war, conflict, and crime, citizens enter into a social contract with the 
government where an individual authorizes the sovereign to use of force to uphold the 
social contract even though this is not an absolute guarantee (Hobbes, 1651). Deterrence, 
as a social contract, upholds the agreement between the state and the people, and 
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individuals are punished for violating this social contract (Hobbes, 1651). Beccaria 
(1963) published a treatise built on the ideals of the social contract philosophers use to 
challenge the rights of the state to punish crimes. Beccaria sided with Hobbes and other 
18th-century Enlightenment writers to advocate the need to judge laws by their 
propensity to afford the “greatest happiness shared by the greatest number” (p. 8).  
Beccaria (1963) argued that if the sole purpose of punishment was to prevent 
crime in society, then punishment became unjust by crossing the acceptable severity 
threshold. Swift and certain punishment offer effective ways of preventing and 
controlling crime (Beccaria, 1963). Siding with other classical theorists, Beccaria posited 
that people are rational beings with free will to govern their own decisions. The theorist 
advocated the publication of laws to allow people to know their intent as well as their 
purpose. As an advocate of the pleasure-pain principle or hedonistic calculus, Beccaria 
postulated that pleasure and pain are the motives of rational people; to prevent crime, the 
pain of punishment must outweigh the pleasure obtained from committing the crime.  
Bentham, a contemporary of Beccaria, was one of the most prominent 18th-
century intellectuals on crime. In a now famous principle of utility, Bentham (1948) 
postulated that the sovereign masters of pain and pleasure governed humankind. Bentham 
also believed that penalties, per se, were evil to the extent that they did not avert greater 
evil, or regulate the actions of offenders, and punishment was also unjustified if it failed 
to promote collective happiness by increasing pleasure and lessening the pain.  
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Wilner’s Contemporary Deterrence Theory and Counterterrorism 
In contemporary times, deterrence theory has been revitalized after nearly two 
decades of obscurity since the end of the Cold War (Wilner, 2015). This resurgence has 
incorporated a mixture of substate and nonstate security concerns, like insurgency, 
terrorism, radicalization, organized transnational crime, cyber insecurity, and piracy 
(Wilner, 2015). Added to the deterrence agenda were traditional interstate security 
dilemmas, stemming from reprobate organizations, nuclear and missile proliferation, and 
recent advances in missile technology and defense (Wilner, 2015). Examined in new and 
exciting ways are concepts like extended deterrence and cumulative deterrence as well as 
strategies such as punishment, denial, delegitimization, dissuasion, and inducements 
(Morral & Jackson, 2009).  
The suspicion about deterrence that started in the early 1990s through the 2001 al-
Qa’eda attack on the United States has started to dissipate (Wilner, 2015). Rather, it 
transformed into a community of scholars and practitioners who have collaborated to 
explore ways to develop and apply deterrence theory as a strategic tool for addressing 
emerging and evolving security situations (Wilner, 2015). The potential risks inherent in 
the effort to develop the scholarship and application of deterrence comes with the rate at 
which the theory is evolving and the inevitable consequences of weakening and 
complicating their implementation (Wilner, 2015).  
The Origin of the Contemporary Deterrence Theory 
The study of deterring terrorism began in response to a post-9/11 research 
program that questioned the early assertions made by U.S. President George W. Bush, 
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U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations 
John Bolton, and a variety of other political and military leaders that terrorism and 
terrorists were altogether undeterrable (Broad, Engelberg, & Glanz, 2001). A similar 
school of thought emerged to contemplate deterrence and rogue states (Wilner, 2015). 
The debate centered on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Slobodan Milosovic’s Serbia, and 
Muammar al-Qaddafi’s Libya in the 1990s but has shifted to deterring nuclear North 
Korea and nuclear-aspirants (Wilner, 2015).  
In both instances, scholars have investigated different ways in which the logic and 
theory of deterrence might be reapplied, and this effort has provided practical insights for 
addressing current challenges and future security circumstances. A research program on 
deterring terrorism (and terrorists, or violent, nonstate actors) has emerged from these 
questions, and new theories, concepts, and models for deterring terrorism have been 
proposed (Wenger & Wilner, 2012). Empirical research has tested and refined some of 
these proposals, and policy recommendations and best practices have begun to circulate 
(Wenger & Wilner, 2012).  
Deterring terrorism places emphasis on targeting the values that militants cherish, 
like publicity, operational and tactical success, strategic and tactical victory, leadership, 
group cohesiveness, trust and camaraderie, popular sympathy and social acceptance, 
religious and political legitimacy, prestige, personal glory, freedom of movement and 
safe havens, wealth, and other material assets (Jenkins, 1975). Most militant groups lack 
traditional territorially based assets against which classical threats of punishment and 
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retaliation might be issued—a dilemma known as the return address problem (Betts, 
2002).  
Some militant assets rest beyond the realm punishable by military or kinetic 
destruction alone; therefore, the coercive process involved in deterring terrorism often 
relies on nonkinetic instruments that target nonphysical resources and assets (Betts, 
2002). This situation may call for deterrence by delegitimization, in which militants’ 
political, ideological, or religious rationales and intentions are used against them to sway 
public sentiment, stem recruitment, alter behavior, and deter support for political violence 
(Dunn, 2008). Several scholars prefer the broader concept of influence over deterrence. 
Davis and Jenkins (2002) argued against the term deterrence in the context of 
counterterrorism because they viewed it as restrictive.   
Adding a component of influence to the study of deterring terrorism will facilitate 
further study (Dunn, 2007). Influence encompasses the concept of deterrence but is 
intended to be applied in ways that go well beyond relying on threats of punishment or 
denial to manipulate behavior. The continuum of influence includes a variety of coercive 
strategies which  include co-optation and inducement - convincing an adversary to join an 
opponent’s larger effort, dissuasion and deterrence - using threats and appreciation of 
negative consequences to convince a challenger to alter intended behavior, denial and 
defense - creating perceptions of tactical/strategic failure in order to change behavior, and 
defeat and destruction - demonstrating a capability to decisively punish today, in order to 
deter tomorrow (Broad et al., 2001). 
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In each case, a key element of a traditional deterrence theory is evident when a 
defender attempts to modify a challenger’s behavior by altering the cost-benefit analysis. 
Both approaches have allowed scholars to think creatively about deterring a very large 
subset of activities related to political violence, radicalization, militancy, insurgency, and 
terrorism. In the past primary focus was placed on Cold War-era deterrence which 
involved states and superpowers and their foreign and military relations; however, 
scholars now place greater attention on the individual actors and subgroups that constitute 
or support militant organizations, along with the individual processes involved in 
orchestrating terrorism (Davis & Jenkins, 2002). A variety of coercive strategies that are 
distinct from those outlined in traditional interstate deterrence theory have been 
developed through research: 
Indirect deterrence. This involves manipulating an actor who is only tangentially 
associated with the unwanted action that is to be deterred. In this case, a state deters 
terrorism by threatening to retaliate against a state sponsor of militancy. The goal is less 
terrorism, but the coercive process starts by threatening a sponsor, which then reins in its 
support for a militant group, which becomes less able to coordinate acts of violence.  
Deterrence by punishment. A classic coercive process that defined the Cold 
War, which has been repackaged to deter substate, nonstate, and individual-level actors. 
This involves targeted killings and the use of drone technology (unmanned aerial 
vehicles), to locate, track, and target individuals.  
Deterrence by denial or defensive denial. This involves deterring violence by 
augmenting structural defenses that restrict the terrorism process.  
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Behavioral denial. This involves deterring violence by introducing 
environmental uncertainty and unpredictability that degrade terrorist planning; Mitigation 
or resilience involves deterring violence by blunting and/or limiting terrorism’s social, 
political, and economic effect. Each of these concepts is rooted in the core assumptions 
that underpin deterrence by denial, but they offer more fine-grained applications for 
deterring militancy.  
Deterrence by delegitimization. This attempts to change an adversary’s behavior 
by manipulating the justifications that inform its preferences (Davis & Jenkins, 2002). 
This strategy employs a group’s interpretation of a sacred narrative or political ideology 
and foment division among and between militants and their community.  
Intrawar deterrence. In counterterrorism this involves deterring aspects of a 
militant group’s behavior while simultaneously engaging in military operations geared 
toward their ultimate destruction and defeat (Wilner, 2013).  
Cumulative deterrence. This describes how coercion might work within 
enduring, iterated, and protracted conflicts between a state and a nonstate adversary. The 
objective is to bank previous military and counter-terrorism successes figuratively, along 
with general perceptions of conventional and nuclear strengths, and to use that 
accumulated wealth of strategic might to persuade an organization that further violence is 
altogether futile (Almog, 2004). The different strategies for deterrence have enhanced the 
development of tools for countering and containing terrorism and militant groups over the 
long term. On the contrary, they have also highlighted a plethora of dilemmas, 
challenges, and paradoxes that need to be reckoned with. 
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Research Application of Deterrence Theory 
 Discussions in this section demonstrates that the first wave of deterrence theory 
had very little impact on policy, and expectedly so, due to its innovative approach which 
was devoid of evidential justification. Jarvis (1979) argued that at the first wave of 
deterrence theory, the idea had relatively minimal impact on policy and was deficient in 
the systematization and richness of the waves that followed (p. 291). The second wave of 
deterrence theory did not fare much better than the first, as it was subjected to intense 
criticisms stemming from limited evidence to validate the ideas advanced.  
Lupovici (2010) opined that the 1950s saw the emergence of the second wave of 
deterrence theory, which incorporated the game theory model, particularly the Chicken 
Game, in the study of deterrence. These perceptions became conventional wisdom aiding 
scholars to a better understanding of the tactics of actors (p. 706). Jervis (1979) asserted 
that this wave drew much criticisms however, due to scant evidence in support or 
validation of these ideas (pp. 291-292). Bringing the fate of the second wave of 
deterrence theory to the same unyielding crossroads encountered by the first wave of 
deterrence theory.  
The lack of supporting evidence and undue reliance on deduction, posed 
difficulties to the third wave of deterrence theory akin to the second wave. Jervis (1979) 
noted however that the empirical research of the third wave, exposed the need to modify 
deterrence theory in relation to risk taking, rewards, probabilities, misconceptions, and 
domestic and bureaucratic politics (pp. 303-314). Lupovici (2010) added that with the 
empirical research on the third wave of deterrence theory, it provided important solutions 
32 
 
to the problems of lack of supporting evidence and heavy reliance on deduction. Further, 
Walt (1991) noted that these solutions were borne out of animated debates about what 
constitutes the requirements of deterrence, the framework for rational deterrence, the 
utility it serves, as well as the proper strategies for evaluating it.     
Distinguishing between general deterrence and immediate deterrence, Huth and 
Russett (1993) opined that a series of escalating threat and counter-threats generally 
progress to a war, hence war very rarely result from a conflict of interest and non-
militarized dispute in peacetime (p. 61). General deterrence the authors contended, is 
characterized by neither adversary using military force nor making active threat to use it, 
hence an absence of crisis in this instance does not necessarily imply the success of 
deterrence.  
Explaining further, Huth and Russett (1993) added on the other hand, that 
immediate deterrence comprises three important elements; active consideration to launch 
an attack by officials in one of the adversary states on another or its allies, awareness of 
this by leaders of the other state, and an issuance of a threat to retaliate by the other state 
to prevent such attack.  
Terrorism and Counterterrorism 
Terrorism  
Scholars delving into the field of discussions on terrorism are confronted with two 
distinct challenges. The first relates to the fact that state terror is often ignored by 
scholars in the study of terrorism because terrorism is not value neutral by any 
estimation. Consequently, the word terrorism forms an object of contention among 
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parties to a conflict. In a political conflict where the struggle relates to control of power 
and influence, as well as which of the parties in the conflict gets to label the other, the 
state often labels political behaviors, since it has control of a large concentration of power 
(Adegbulu, 2013). Applying the term to activities of a group, organization, or state 
institution conveys contempt and those to whom terrorism is applied regard it as an 
accusation and in turn label their accusers the real terrorist, adding to the ambiguity and 
confusion (Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Hirsh-Hoefler, 2004). 
The second challenge which has haunted the study of terrorism for decades, 
relates to definitional problems, consequently, numerous definitions of the term terrorism 
abound, without any generally accepted definition of the term among scholars. Few terms 
or concepts have presented challenges of definition as terrorism has, in contemporary 
political discourse (Weinberg et al., 2004). The problem of defining terrorism Crenshaw 
(2000) opined, which has hindered analysis since the inception of studies in early 1970, 
shows few signs of abating as we approach the 21st century. 
 Schmid, (2004) opined that the challenge of defining terrorism presents similar 
difficulties involved in attempts to define terrorist organization. Noting further the issue 
of lack of consensus on general theoretical laws of terrorism, Crenshaw (2014) offered 
that researchers have rather defined key concepts and deepened explanations of cause, 
effect, and process (p. 557). This lack of a consensus on what constitutes terrorism, 
accounts for the lack of a clear classification of insurgent groups in Nigeria as terrorist 
groups from the inception of their campaign of attacks.  
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Consequently, Akpan et al. (2014) noted that Boko Haram is the first insurgent 
group in Nigeria classified by the United States and its allies as a terrorist organization, 
due to Boko Haram’s use of sophisticated tactics and unprecedented lethality in its deadly 
campaign. Boko Haram has remained the only group in Nigeria to be designated as such, 
yet the trajectory of attacks by the group remains unparalleled. It is fortunate, however, 
that their activities have not been replicated by other groups since the start of attacks by 
Boko Haram in 2009. 
However, the ability of Boko Haram to regroup and intensify their vicious attacks, 
was seen in the reconstruction and reemergence by the remnants of the group with 
fortified numbers in their membership, after their retreat from a violent clash with 
Nigerian security forces which resulted in the loss of many of their members. The 
brutality that defined their increasing attacks, were not contemplated or expected by the 
Nigerian Security forces. And the unrestrained manner of attacks by the group and the 
annihilation of villages during their attacks with little or no intervention by the Nigerian 
security forces, indicate a lack of preparedness by the government to confront Boko 
Haram.  
Furthermore, another dimension to the definitional challenges in the study of 
terrorism, is the fact that the study of terrorism like other subjects amenable to social 
scientific analysis, has also undergone significant transformation by technology, which 
makes aggregate data easily available and accessible (Crenshaw, 2014). This 
transformation through technology, necessitates the ability of terrorists to continue to 
evolve in the choice of weapons employed in modern terrorism. As shown in the 
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September 11, 2001 attacks Hoffman (2002) noted that the weapons of modern terrorism 
for Bin Laden, are critically not the long-standing traditional weapons of terrorism such 
as guns and bombs, but the minicam, video tapes, and the Internet (p. 307). Hence the 
Internet is replete with videotaped and still picture messages of attacks by terrorist 
groups. 
The transformative impact of technology on terrorism, ensures a much wider 
reach of the goal of terrorism, which in effect includes conjuring fear and trepidation, to 
guarantee submission to the terrorist demands by the victims targeted (Ajayi, 2012). To 
be adequate therefore, a definition of terrorism must capture the elements of the weapons 
employed in modern terrorism, beyond a definitional focus of the use of guns, bombs and 
other age-old weapons of terrorism. 
 However, for the focus of this study, a few definitional approaches appear 
relevant to the focus of devising more effective strategies and approach by the 
government to contain terrorism by Boko Haram. These will be presented briefly and 
serve as working definitions for this study. Terrorism was defined as the use of force or 
violence or the threat of force or violence to change the behavior of a whole society, by 
causing fear and by targeting specific parts of society to affect the entire society 
(Garrison, 2004, p. 278). The surreptitious nature of the terrorist attacks by Boko Haram, 
results in crippling fear that affects every facet of the community subject to the attacks, as 
well as the entire Nigerian society. 
On the other hand, terrorism was also viewed as the intentional, random murder 
of defenseless noncombatants, with the intention of instilling fear or mortal danger 
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among civilians as a strategy designed to advance political ends (Meisels, 2009, p. 348). 
This definition of terrorism reflects the trajectory of attacks employed by Boko Haram in 
decimating members of the community subject to its attack. The goal of modern terrorists 
to cause fear and alter behaviors of a whole society, reaches far and wide very easily by 
their use of technology. Efforts to avert a successful strike and impact of terrorist attacks 
must also shift from the usual approach of dealing with insurgences after the fact and 
employ effective strategies to pre-empt and deter terrorist plans. 
  It follows therefore to note, that while the governance crisis may not necessarily 
be the initial cause of terrorism, such attendant and prevailing situation is germane to the 
radicalization of groups advocating for different endemic causes due to corruption, 
inequality, poverty, and repression by the government. Hence, the governance crisis 
makes room for terrorism to escalate undeterred, with no signs of abatement, due to the 
failure of government to deliver on its social contract to the people and as well as failure 
to employ effective measures to deter and contain the terrorist acts.  
Counterterrorism  
This section describes counter-terrorism using the same lens employed in viewing 
terrorism, consistent with the working definition adopted for this study: terrorism is the 
use of force or violence or the threat of force or violence to change the behavior of a 
whole society, by causing fear and by targeting specific parts of society to affect the 
entire society (Garrison 2004, p. 278). It follows then that counterterrorism encompasses 
a rival strategy that protects the whole society from the use of force or violence or the 
threat thereof, to ensure the status quo ante. In the same vein, Oyewole (2013) noted that 
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while terrorism is a means to disorder, counterterrorism is, therefore, by definition, an 
obligation to maintain and restore order (p. 254). 
 Oyewole (2013) highlighted three foremost counter-terrorism measures to include 
(a) military-based, (b) justice-based, and (c) political-based. Proponents of military-based 
counter-terrorism measures are convinced of the fact that terrorists are nihilist. The 
author further contended that the fact should not be denigrated therefore, that terrorists 
who threaten states should be faced with a military counter-terrorism strategy that serves 
to stop further attacks by the terrorists.  
This military-based approach employs the idea of war on terrorism  which 
Oyewole (2013) argued that it positions the fight against terrorism in military terms as an 
enemy-centric war and charges the armed forces with the responsibility of developing 
and effecting strategic responses. However, this may be emotionally satisfying in the 
immediate term, in view of the human and material cost of the war on terrorism, but on 
the other hand, it casts a shadow of fear and destruction that no one would want to live 
with permanently.  
 In the justice-policing counter-terrorism model, terrorism is viewed as a crime 
deserving legal redress. Criminalization of various types of conduct is paramount to this 
counter-terrorism approach necessitating the detection, investigation, prevention, and 
prosecution through the court system of acts of terrorism (Oyewole, 2013). Policing and 
arraigning terrorists before the law courts, will be executed by the state, which will 
ensure that internationally acceptable legal standards guide the trial and sentencing of the 
terrorists (Oyewole, 2013). Justice-policing counterterrorism places a high premium on 
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the need for transparency and protection of human rights (Oyewole, 2013). The justice-
policing counter-terrorism model faces the challenge of the inconsistencies and 
inadequacies apparent in the legal definitions of terrorism as well as the attendant 
contradictions.  
 In the political counter-terrorism model, the task of defining what terrorist, 
terrorism, and counterterrorism means, rests with the policymakers (Oyewole, 2013). 
The pressure to show due diligence to justice and fairness and demonstrate the capability 
of the government to respond rapidly to emergencies resulting from terrorist attacks, is 
coupled with the need for the policymakers to show accountability to domestic and 
international stakeholders.  
These pertinent and equally important needs have led to the emergence of hard 
politics and soft politics in the political counter-terrorism model (Oyewole, 2013). Hard 
political counter-terrorism measures involve militarized policing and a war-like hunt for 
terrorists, with the motive of eliminating and deterring them. Oyewole (2013) contended 
however, that liberal scholars show that hard politics makes democracy less practicable 
and enables dictators to silence oppositions. This is especially true in a country like 
Nigeria where the government goes to great lengths to shut down oppositions to its 
unpopular polices, undermining the country’s democratic system. 
 Soft political counter-terrorism measures often referred to as the diplomatic model 
on the other hand, works on the assumption that a political approach yields better 
dividends of justice for terrorists and against them as well, rather than the courts 
(Oyewole, 2013). The author further stated that this model of counterterrorism entails a 
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soft power approach, consisting of population-centric methods (Oyewole, 2013) that 
makes the interests of the population foremost and an intricate part of the process. 
Featured in this method are such things as capacity building, democratization, economic 
development, and counter-radicalization policies that highlight the underlying causes that 
enable terrorism to thrive and focus on addressing these causes (Oyewole, 2013). This 
soft power approach is apparently not an immediate response approach to an ongoing 
terrorism but should ideally be implemented genuinely and consistently to counter further 
radicalization efforts of terrorist—in essence providing an effective deterrence against 
acts of terrorism by Boko Haram that creates crippling siege and civil unrest which rob 
communities of normalcy in their daily lives.  
Governance and Crisis in Nigeria 
 This section was organized in subsections to cover governance and the 
governance crisis in Nigeria. 
Governance 
 The nature of governance in a country is reflective of the difference in culture, 
values, and developmental milestones between the developed and developing countries of 
the world, which naturally affects the security parameters obtainable in the country. The 
World Bank (1992) noted a widely applicable definition of governance as “the exercise 
of authority, control, management, power of government,” but leans for its purposes 
towards the definition of governance as “the manner, in which power is exercised in the 
management of a country’s economic and social resources for development” (p. 3). A 
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government falls short on effective exercise of control, if the government is lacking on 
any of the indexes of governance. 
This definitional approach by the World Bank places good governance 
synonymously with sound development management, which is fundamental to creating 
and sustaining an environment that fosters strong and equitable development. Such an 
environment ensures not only the security of the state through military might, from 
external aggression, but also guarantees the protection of the critical security of human 
beings from internal insecurities.  
Four areas of governance consistent with the World Bank’s mandate include 
public sector management, accountability, the legal framework for development, and 
information and transparency. The presence of these elements in the governance of a 
state, points to its competence and effectiveness. On the other hand, contributing to poor 
development management are such factors as weak institutions, lack of an adequate legal 
framework, weak financial accounting and auditing systems, damaging discretionary 
interventions, uncertain and variable policy framework, and closed decision making, 
which elevates risks of corruption and waste (World Bank, 1992, p. 4).  
The Governance Crisis in Nigeria  
The governance crisis here depicts the failure or inability of the government to 
exercise the important indexes of good governance and meet its basic social contract to 
the people, of ensuring and guaranteeing the two arms of approach in security studies 
advanced by scholars. The traditional approach generally regarded as the first approach, 
takes cognizance of the role of the state and the external military dimension of security. 
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The second approach on the other hand covers critical security approaches involving 
human beings (Onoja, 2014).  
Further highlighting the vacuum that creates the governance crisis, the author 
added that since independence, Nigeria has failed to achieve good governance because it 
lacks most of the indexes of governance, hence Nigeria falls short of the ideal measured 
yardstick for observing good governance (Onoja, 2014). This also means the government 
is incapable of employing the important indices of the soft power approach to political 
counter-terrorism, to implement capacity-building, democratization, economic 
development and counterradicalization policies that address the underlying causes which 
provide fertile ground for terrorism to thrive and serve as a deterrent to the radicalization 
efforts of terrorist groups.  
Fundamentalist Uprisings and Insurgency in Nigeria 
 This section was organized in the following subsections: overview of 
fundamentalist uprisings in Nigeria, emergence of Boko Haram, chronology of attacks by 
Boko Haram, internal insecurities and insurgencies, and ethno-religious tensions in 
Northern Nigeria. 
Overview of Fundamentalist Uprisings in Nigeria 
 Looking back between the periods of 1980s and 1990s, the Nigerian scene had 
been dotted with pockets of Islamic fundamentalism, the prevalence of which had given 
rise to ethnoreligious crisis, resulting in grave loses of human and material resources. The 
manifestation of these crisis was witnessed on a large scale during the Maitatsine uprising 
which lasted from 1980 through 1985. Adesoji (2011) opined that the Maitatsine 
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uprisings of 1980 preceded by the Shiite movement of the late 1970s to 1980s, had as its 
major player Mohammed Yusuf, who would become the leader of Boko Haram years 
later.  
The politicization of the secular Nigerian state along religious lines found strong 
footing in 1977-1978, with the debate in the National Assembly for and against the 
provision of a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal in the proposed 1979 Constitution, 
although the ensuing conflict did not end in arms bearing as witnessed in 1980 (Adesoji, 
2011). The ongoing politicization and destabilization of the country manifested in the 
activities of Boko Haram, points to the ethnic and religious divisions in the country, 
which had widened over the years (Osumah, 2013). The Boko Haram uprising of 2009 
share similarities with the Maitatsine uprisings of the 1980s in both advancing Islamic 
fundamentalism, and an apparent lack of readiness by the Nigerian government to contain 
the threat (Adesoji, 2011).   
Emergence of Boko Haram  
There are varying and contradictory accounts of the emergence and 
transformation of the Sect, Jama’atu Ahlis Suna Lidda’awati Wal Jihad, generally known 
as Boko Haram – which translates to forbid everything western and western education or 
Western education is a sin (Adegbulu, 2013, Amusan & Oyewole, 2014, Oyewole, 2013). 
The official name of the group is Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, in Arabic 
stands for People committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and Jihad. A 
literal translation of this is Association of Sunnas for the Propagation of Islam and for 
Holy War (Osumah, 2013).  
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The variations in the date that the Boko Haram group was believed to have 
emerged is evident in the literature on the group. Ajayi (2012) posited that the group 
surfaced under several different names, including Shabaab Muslim Youth Organisation, 
Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah hijra, Yusufiyya, Hijrah Ummah, Jamaatul Takfur Wal Hyra 
Ahlus Sunna, Khawaarji and Nigerian Taliban. He further contended that the actual date 
of inception of the sect, is still subject of controversy, as the years 1995, 1999, 2000, 
2002, and 2003, have been associated with the emergence of the sect at different times.  
In his discussion on the group Osumah (2013) noted that it has been in existence 
since the 1960s but started drawing focus to itself from 2002. Adegbulu (2013) added 
that Mohammed Yusuf established Boko Haram in 2001, upon his return from Chad and 
Sudan, where he studied Qur’an and developed radical views, with no tolerance for 
westernization and modernization (p. 266) which he estimates as being responsible for 
the societal ills that have plagued the Nigerian people. 
Drawing from the general strain theory of terrorism, it has been contended that an 
influential element of engaging in terrorism is group membership, which enables 
expression of individual strains and grievances as collective experiences (Agnew, 2010). 
The author further stated that when the collective strains experienced by people, include 
the elements of being high in magnitude with civilians affected, unjust, and affliction by 
significantly powerful others, among which include complicit civilians with weak ties to 
the strained collectivity, there is an increase in the likelihood of terrorism for several 
reasons, although terrorism does not result in all cases (Agnew, 2010). 
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Mohammed Yusuf’s organization of the group and leadership of Boko Haram saw 
the successful radicalization of the group and a venture into foreign collaboration with 
the Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb. Mohammed Yusuf fired up the activism by the group, 
and increased efforts to propagate extreme Islamic doctrine which condemns democracy 
and western education as corrupt and immoral. His intent was to replace modern state 
formation with the traditional Islamic state, robust with pure Islamic practices, because of 
his strong conviction that western values run contrary to Islamic values (Adegbulu, 2013, 
Amusan & Oyewole, 2014).  
A major grievance that the Boko Haram group wants to eliminate is the perceived 
negative consequences of western education, which has produced many societal ills. 
Although Mohammed Yusuf held a western education university degree, he encouraged 
the support of Boko Haram members, for the prohibition of western education, and armed 
himself with two fundamental economic reasons. One of the reasons, is linked to the 
growing graduate unemployment in Nigeria after obtaining western education university 
degrees. The second reason relates to the attendant fact that western educated leaders in 
Nigeria have evidently been corrupt and unethical (Amusan & Oyewole, 2014). 
Mohammed Yusuf estimated that replacing western influences with pure Islamic 
practices, will bring about the ideal society.  
Attacks by Boko Haram  
Table 1 in Appendix A represents a selection of the killings by Boko Haram. It 
captures some of the chronology of the deadly attacks by Boko Haram on police stations, 
army barracks, prisons, churches, public institutions, prominent personalities, and local 
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branch offices of international organizations. Because attacks by Boko Haram are either 
grossly under-reported or lacking adequate verification, the chronology of attacks from 
July 2009 to July 2015 presented on the table below cannot be alleged as exhaustive but 
presents a sample of the numerous attacks by the group.  
Further, as more attacks by Boko Haram continue to be recorded expansively and 
progressively, the chronology of attacks continues to grow. Ajayi (2012) noted that there 
has not been appreciable change, notwithstanding a dialog between the federal 
government and representatives of the group, as well as a clamp down on the group by 
security forces (p. 104). While the clandestine attacks by Boko Haram presents unique 
challenges to efforts of control by law enforcement, the introduction of suicide bombings 
by the perpetrators in the belief of a robust reward in heaven, compounds the challenge 
even further.  
Internal Insecurities and Insurgencies 
Internal insecurities. Internal insecurities as conceived here denotes an absence 
of internal security. In the literature, there are two dominant approaches to the conception 
of internal security management, these are the traditional and modern approaches 
(Osumah, 2013). Discussing the two fundamental perspectives that have emerged among 
scholars attempting to define national security, Innocent and Onyishi (2014) offered that 
one perspective directs focus on strategic definition. This reflects a realist perspective 
conceptualizing national security in terms of self-defense, and a dependence on the use of 
arms and military might to deter aggression against a state. The second perspective on the 
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other hand, indicates a focus on non-strategic definition emphasizing socio-economic 
factors. 
Walt (1991) expanded on the focus of discussions on national security studies 
centered on the use of military power, which is subject to political control. He noted that 
military power, which is a more traditional approach, is not the only source of national 
security, and military threats are not the only dangers that states face although usually the 
most serious (p. 213). Operating from the military angle, the traditional approach engages 
physical force in deterring dangers or aggressions, hence emphasizing the establishment 
of security apparatus in sovereign states (Osumah, 2013).  
This notion of security Osumah (2013) asserted, is deficient in covering such 
nonmilitary threats as human-induced environmental pressures, resource war, migration, 
displacements or refugee crisis, population explosion and identity crisis, all of which 
create conditions of insecurity and a blind spot which the modern approach to security 
has laid emphasis on, since the end of the cold war.     
Employing the traditional approach to internal security in dealing with the 
carnage by Boko Haram, the Nigerian government established a Special Military 
Taskforce, the JTF made up of the army, navy, air force and the department of state 
security and as well as the police. The operations of the Special Military Taskforce, and 
the checkpoints established, as well as curfews imposed did little in stopping the 
activities of Boko Haram. In view of the inability of the security forces to contain the 
activities of Boko Haram using militarized force, the situation begs the need for a 
different approach that is devoid of reactive responses but geared towards stopping the 
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plans devised by Boko Haram, through counterradicalization policies, before they are 
implemented by the group.  
Innocent and Onyishi (2014) urged a change of approach from the tactics of 
extrajudicial killings employed by the Nigerian security agencies in dealing with the 
problem of Boko Haram. The authors added that this approach in its brutality, 
exacerbates increasing attacks by Boko Haram, hence, is counterproductive. The authors, 
further urged the need for the Nigerian government to take a cue from the terrorism 
fighting lessons of 9-11 in the United States and engage the use of intelligence that will 
unearth plans by Boko Haram, to use improvised explosive devices against targeted 
establishments, before the group carries out such plans.  
Brief overview of insurgencies in Nigeria. Examining insurgencies in Nigeria 
within the social movement theories, Abdullahi, Adekeke, and Balogun (2014) argued 
that the inherent social structural maladies and/or prevailing sociopolitical environment, 
have provided impetus for the emergence and sustenance of insurgencies among the 
youths in Nigeria. Historically, Nigerian youths have been known to initiate and foster 
campaigns for progressive change in response to the prevalent need for it, in the 
environment created by the dominant Nigerian polity. It is therefore to be expected that in 
a Nigerian political climate, riddled with corruption and a widening socio-economic 
disparity attendant in the communities of Northern Nigeria, it will not take much 
radicalizing efforts by groups like Boko Haram, to organize the youths to revolt. 
 Nigerian youths prior to and immediately after independence employed various 
social movements, political and intellectual platforms to serve as watchdogs to the 
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formulation and implementation of national policies pertaining to socio-economic and 
political issues considered by majority of the people as unpopular (Abdullahi et al., 
2014). The authors further noted that post-independence, young people in Nigerian have 
expressed their displeasure over perceived anti-people policy initiatives of the ruling 
elites, through nationwide protests and demonstrations. The authors however bemoaned 
the apparent disappearance, among contemporary youths in Nigeria, of the zeal and 
enthusiasm for mass mobilization and protests of widespread social injustice and human 
rights abuses (p. 80). 
 The weakening of the radical but positive elements of youth mobilization, due 
partly to the infiltration of the youth movement, by the ruling elites for self-serving 
motives. They achieve this through recruitment among students and political sponsorship 
of such recruits, to champion the interests of the ruling elites over national interests. This 
approach creates an environment that enables sectarian mobilization and revolts to thrive. 
Hence, groups like Boko Haram are made possible by the absence of an organized and 
unified platform among the youths, to constructively confront bad governance, and the 
resultant corruption and attendant socio-economic disparity of the ruling elites and the 
mass of the people.  
 Abdullahi et al. (2014) contended further that what seems to be common among 
Nigerian youths in the absence of an organized front are polarized interests, championing 
ethnic-based politics with grave impact on ethnic militia and insurgency. What results 
from such polarized interests is the alignment of groups like Boko Haram, to ethnic 
politics to pursue extreme and controversial mission (Abdullahi et al., 2014). It is 
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therefore not farfetched to imagine that the prevailing socio-economic environment of 
widening disparity between the ruling elites and the people, provides fertile ground for 
the sprouting of insurgencies in Nigeria. 
The campaign of violent acts of terrorism that Boko Haram staged, drew public 
notice between 2002 and 2009 in Nigeria following repeated strikes which started at the 
headquarters of the Nigerian Police Force in Borno State (Maiangwa et al., 2012). 
Mohammed Yusuf formed Boko Haram, guided by the philosophy that Western 
civilization in all its ramifications, runs in conflict with the tenets of the Islamic faith 
(Maiangwa et al., 2012). Instilling Islamic education in the youth, formed a central goal 
and means for the group to safeguard Islamic societies of the north and curb the extreme 
tendencies of globalization (Mu’azu, 2011).  
A violent clash between the group and Nigerian Security forces, resulted in the 
killing of hundreds of Boko Haram members and subsequently the leader of the group 
Mohammed Youssef, while in the custody of Nigerian Security forces. Boko Haram went 
underground, reconstructed itself, and then reemerged as a violent extremist organization 
under a new and fanatical leadership (Asfura-Heim & McQuaid, 2015 p. 21). The killing 
of innocent and unsuspecting people by Boko Haram, drew violent responses from the 
Nigerian security forces. These responses were thought then to be the best approach to 
decimate the group and stop further attacks.  
Boko Haram engenders in the wake of these attacks, country wide insecurities, 
and increased tensions among ethno-religious groups. These deadly acts of terror have 
made Boko Haram the focus of national security concern (Oyewole, 2013). Issues such as 
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systemic deficiencies in the political environment in Nigeria and failures by the Nigerian 
government to address the root causes and symptoms of terrorism (Onah, 2014, Umar, 
2013) enable the insecurities engendered by the deadly acts of terror by Boko Haram to 
foster. 
The structural reasons such as incompetent and corrupt government, indicated in 
the research literature as fueling the grievances of individuals and groups to thrive, is 
exacerbated by extreme poverty, unemployment, and limited political and socioeconomic 
opportunities (Forrest, 2012), in the community Boko Haram operates from. The poverty 
and dearth of development in the Northern states of Nigeria can therefore be directly 
linked to the emergence of Boko Haram (Owolade, 2014). The group blames this 
situation on the corrupting influence of the West on the governance of the Northern 
states. Hence for Boko Haram, an armed revolt presents a solution to the widening 
regional economic disparity (Owolade, 2014), between the ruling elites and the masses.  
This does not however suggest that the activities and attacks witnessed from Boko 
Haram, could have been imagined as likely responses to the attendant socio-economic 
conditions of the community of Boko Haram. Attempts by the government to gloss over 
the issues, will most certainly not yield the desired results of ending insurgencies, but 
rather exacerbate the problems. A genuine effort by the government to reverse this trend, 
must entail and encompass capacity building, as well as implementing policies that 
provides for and responds to the underlying issues, and causes that enable terrorism to 
thrive. 
Ethno-Religious Tensions in Northern Nigeria 
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An increasing Islamic fundamentalism the world over, in addition to several 
internal factors such as; religious sensitivity of Nigerians, economic displacements 
prevalent in the Nigerian society, party politics plagued by politicians in desperate search 
of self-serving political powers, and the ambivalence of some vocal Islamic leaders in 
condemning insurrections only feebly if at all, contribute greatly to make the Nigerian 
society prone to violence as opined by Adesoji (2010). The volatile state of the Nigerian 
society is more evident in Northern Nigeria due to the paucity of economic and 
educational opportunities, and a widening regional economic disparity, which fuels the 
breeding of religious insurrection and ethno-religious conflicts, among various ethnic 
groups inhabiting Northern Nigeria.  
The disenfranchisement of the common people by the Northern elites, affords the 
commoners the opportunity to initiate uprisings in demand for social justice and to 
advocate the displacement of the “establishment” with a mode of governance consistent 
with true Islamic principles and economic prosperity for the people (Owolade, 2014). The 
problem with initiating such uprisings, however, is the absence of a formal frame of 
reference, which therefore allows for indiscriminate actions that lead to great loses of 
lives and properties. 
Nigerian Government’s Responses to Terrorism 
 This subsection was organized in the following areas: defense of national 
security; and armed responses. 
Defense of National Security 
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A state is obliged to defend against any actor causing a disruption, in the quest to 
change the structure and regulating framework (Oyewole, 2013, p. 254) the state has in 
place. Although Boko Haram is a nonstate actor, nonetheless, the activities of the group 
in addition to its ideological mission pose increasing threats to the national security of 
Nigeria and its people. Boko Haram articulates the need to overthrow the Nigerian 
government, which the group estimates, is marred by Western Civilization. It advocates 
instead the imposition of a strict Islamic Sharia law, threatening through this ideology, 
the security of Nigeria.  
Thus, this naturally creates an extreme rivalry to the goal of the government to 
maintain security and stability, creating also a corresponding obligation on the part of the 
Nigerian government to defend against this threat. However, an admission by the 
Nigerian Federal Government that the state of insecurity, is worse than what obtained 
during the Nigerian civil war of 1960 (Osumah, 2013) highlights the diminished ability of 
the Nigerian government and the security agencies to contain the group. 
The activities of Boko Haram amount to an active threat from an adversary armed 
increasingly with sophisticated weapons, which the Nigerian government needs to deter 
by a superior, and quality law enforcement capability. Further, Oyewole (2013) argued 
that those in authority are obliged to come in the defense of a state in view of disruption 
caused by any actor in their quest to alter the regulating framework and structure of the 
state (p. 254).  
For the efforts of a state to defend against a threat to its national security to be 
effective however, those efforts must incorporate and consider the context of the terrorist 
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activities by the perpetrators. It is paramount to note at this juncture the observation by 
Crenshaw (1991) that the prevailing context of a terrorist activity, is likely to influence 
different outcomes in the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations. A nonstate 
violent actor Crenshaw (2014) opined, wants to achieve two outcomes simultaneously, 
first to win for the cause, and secondly to survive and prosper as an organization and 
prevail over competitors (p. 559). In the same vein, Krause (2013) noted that in a strategy 
of violence against the state, groups seek to further long-term ideological goals such as 
independence, revolution, societal transformation, regime change among others, while 
seeking simultaneously to promote the success of their own group over any rival group.  
Joint Task Force 
Oyewole (2013) deemed it appropriate to view counterterrorism as a rival 
political strategy to the political goal terrorism seeks to achieve. Nigeria’s handling of the 
Islamic fundamentalist uprising has been described as a paradox of terrorism and 
counterterrorism (Sampson, 2015). The author contends that the counter-terrorism efforts 
by Nigeria through the JTF are no less abrasive on the residents of Northern Nigerian, 
than the profoundly agonizing impact of the terrorism by Boko Haram, due to the human 
right abuses by the JTF. The activities of the JTF Sampson (2015) further stated, run 
contrary to the fundamental obligation of government, relating to the protection of 
individuals and the basic human right security guaranteed by articles 3 and 13 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights per the Office of United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights.  
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This study aimed to show that the efforts of the Nigerian security agencies in 
handling fundamentalist insurgencies, reveal not only an apparent inability to protect the 
territory of the state and the basic human rights of individuals, but also systemic 
deficiencies in considering alternative measures that could enhance deterrence by the 
security agencies. Factors such as security sector corruption and mismanagement which 
leaves Nigerian troops less resourced and not adequately equipped to face the insurgency 
(Blanchard, 2014) constrain the responses of the Nigerian security forces, to counter the 
threat posed by Boko Haram. The inability of the Nigerian security agencies to contain 
the menace of Boko Haram reveals the diminished and degraded nature (Osumah, 2013) 
of the security agencies, especially if security at the societal level as opined by Osumah 
(2013) stresses freedom from external aggression or a defense thereof against it, by 
ensuring the protection and preservation within the territories of the state, of both human 
and strategic rudiments.  
Summary and Conclusions 
A critical review and analysis of literature on the Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria 
highlights the deliberate and careful choice of targets for deadly attacks by Boko Haram, 
in furtherance of the group’s mission to displace the Nigerian government and its 
perceived un-Islamic ways (Forest, 2012). Boko Haram constitutes a focus of national 
security concern (Oyewole, 2013). The literature showed that the deadly activities of 
Boko Haram have been fostered by such issues as systemic deficiencies (Onah, 2014) as 
well as the failures to address the root causes and symptoms that enable terrorism to 
thrive by the Nigerian government (Umar, 2013).  
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I highlighted and noted the contention that the activities of Boko Haram have 
been exacerbated by the militarized heavy handedness responses and repressive 
approaches of the Nigerian government (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012), which did little to 
contain the expanding and increasing campaign of terror by Boko Haram. Also, the 
activities of the JTF charged with the responsibility of repelling Boko Haram, have been 
marred by human rights abuses that worsened the plights of the people rather than 
alleviate their anxieties and pains from the effects of Boko Haram attacks. 
However, there is sparse research on the need to understand the causes of failure 
in counter-terrorism measures by the Nigerian government and to explore alternate 
approaches to deter terrorism through the efforts by the government to confront and 
ameliorate the terroristic threat from Boko Haram in Borno State. This leaves a vacuum 
that needs to be filled through a research effort. This qualitative case study sought to 
bridge the gap in the scholarly research leading to a lack of knowledge and understanding 
about how alternative measures can be explored using Wilner’s (2015) construct of 
contemporary deterrence theory to enhance effective counter-terrorism measures by the 
Nigerian security forces to deter acts of terrorism by Boko Haram in Borno State. 
The theoretical foundation that grounded this study was drawn from Wilner’s 
(2015) construct of contemporary deterrence theory. It posited that there has been an 
addition to the deterrence agenda of more traditional inter-state security dilemmas, 
stemming from rogue organizations, nuclear and missile proliferation, and recent 
advances in missile technology and defense (Wilner, 2015). Strategies like punishment, 
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denial, de-legitimization, dissuasion, inducements and concepts like extended deterrence 
and cumulative deterrence are being examined in new and exciting ways (Wilner, 2015).  
The suspicion about deterrence that started in the early 1990s through the 2001 al-
Qa’eda attack on the United States has started to dissipate (Wilner, 2015), and those 
efforts have morphed into a community of scholars and practitioners who have partnered 
to investigate ways to develop and apply deterrence theory as a strategic tool for 
addressing emerging and evolving security situations (Wilner, 2015). The effort to 
expand the scholarship and application of deterrence comes with potential risks of the 
rate at which the theory is evolving and the inevitable consequences of diluting and 
complicating their implementation (Wilner, 2015).  
My review of the scholarly literature showed that the counter-terrorism measures 
by the Nigerian government to deter terrorist acts by the Boko Haram group 
characterized by militarized heavy handedness, hard politics, and a repressive state 
security approach have been counterproductive (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Oyewole, 
2013; Solomon, 2012). Scholars have also advanced that the Nigerian government should 
not replicate the methods employed in containing other militant insurgent groups, in the 
fight against Boko Haram. The review also found that the response of the government 
which is focused on addressing the symptoms of terrorism remains inadequate (Akpan et 
al., 2014; Umar, 2013) hence the need to seek alternate approaches to deal with the 
underlying causes that led to the failure of past counter-terrorism measures, and thus 
address the menace of Boko Haram terrorism. 
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 Described in Chapter 2 were the strategies employed for literature search, the 
theoretical foundation that underpinned this study, an overview of Islamic religious 
uprisings in Nigeria, internal insecurities in the wake of the Islamic fundamentalist 
uprisings, Nigerian Government’s responses to Islamic fundamentalist insurgencies, 
ethno-religious tensions in Northern Nigeria. Chapter 3 addresses the research design and 
the rationale for choosing it, the role of the researcher in the research, as well as the 
methodology, and issues pertaining to trustworthiness.  
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to fill the gap in knowledge by 
understanding the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian 
government and exploring alternate approaches to the counterterrorism efforts in Borno 
State. I collected data for this study from in-depth, semi-structured, face-to-face 
interviews with 10 senior government officials in the NPF. The interviews were 
approximately 60 minutes long. The interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed 
manually as well as with the use of NVivo to facilitate the generation of initial codes, 
identification of themes, and collation of codes into potential themes and categories. The 
research was conducted following the guidelines from Walden University’s Institutional 
Review Board (IRB). In Chapter 3, I explain the rationale for the research design, the 
researcher’s role, methodology, and issues relating to trustworthiness. 
Research Design and Rationale 
Research Questions 
This qualitative case study research addressed the following two research 
questions:  
RQ1: What have been the causes of failure in counter-terrorism measures by the 
Nigerian government in Borno State?   
RQ2: What alternative approaches have been considered and not used, or not 
considered at all? 
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Case Study Design Research Rationale 
The rationale to use a qualitative method for this research was drawn from the 
following considerations and logic. A quantitative method would not have been 
appropriate for this research effort because the study involved the subjective perceptions, 
opinions, and behaviors of government officials to yield insights and an in-depth 
understanding of the topic (see Braun & Clarke, 2006) that cannot be measured by using 
standardized instruments commonly associated with quantitative methods to seek 
empirical generalizations (see Patton, 2002). I decided that the mixed method would not 
be suitable for this study because it entails the collection and integration of both 
quantitative and qualitative data in research. A qualitative method was used for this study 
because it enabled me to develop an in-depth understanding of and provide a thick and 
rich description of the complex nature of the problem in a holistic manner. Qualitative 
methods also facilitate exhaustive study of issues (Patton, 2002). 
 There are five major qualitative research approaches: phenomenology, grounded 
theory, narrative research, ethnography, and case study; however, upon close review of 
these approaches, I determined that the case study approach was the best fit for this study. 
Any given design inevitably reflects some imperfect interplay of resources, capabilities, 
purposes, possibilities, creativity, and personal judgments by the people involved (Patton, 
2002). The case study research is a preferred method in situations where the researcher 
seeks to answer why and how questions, has little or no control over behavioral events, 
and the focus of the study is a contemporary phenomenon (Yin, 2013). The case study 
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research design was appropriate for this study because I sought to explain the why and 
how questions relating to alternative approaches to deter terrorism in Borno State.  
In this study, I explored in-depth what caused the failure of past counterterrorism 
measures and how alternative approaches by security agencies could deter terrorism in 
Borno State. The case study design enabled me to provide a focused explanation of this 
complex phenomenon from the responses of senior government officials in the NPF as 
well as explore reasons behind the failure of government agencies to contain terrorism in 
Borno State. The design also allowed me to focus on the case and retain a holistic and 
real-world perspective (see Yin, 2013) pertaining to counterterrorism in Nigeria with 
specific focus on the NPF.  
I employed a case study research design in this study to explore the approaches of 
the NPF by conducting interviews with 10 senior government officials in the NPF. The 
purpose was to explore why earlier counterterrorism measures failed and whether 
alternative measures to deter the terroristic threat from Boko Haram in Borno State have 
been considered. I employed purposive sampling to select 10 senior government officials 
from the NPF as participants for data collection through in-depth, semistructured 
interviews.  
Analysis of the data comprised of thematic analysis, which involves a method of 
identifying, analyzing, and reporting patterns and themes found within the data (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis offers a flexible yet useful research tool capable of 
providing a complex account of data that are rich and detailed (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In 
addition, I compared themes from the interviews with secondary data sources. The 
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thematic analysis of the data resulted in a rich description of the entire data set, enabling 
the emergence of predominant or important themes that helped to describe how 
alternative measures can be considered as deterrence strategies for the counterterrorism 
efforts by the Nigerian government in Borno State. The transcripts of the interviews were 
analyzed inductively using NVivo as well as manually to facilitate complete immersion 
into the data and the generation of codes and identification of themes and categories to 
accurately reflect the entire data set (see Braun & Clarke, 2006).  
Role of the Researcher 
In qualitative research, the researcher is an integral part of the process rather than 
taking the detached and objective stance of the researcher in a quantitative research (see 
Braun & Clarke, 2006). Data collection is key in a qualitative study; therefore, I served as 
the key instrument in collecting the data by being a participant in the semistructured 
interview process. I had direct contact with the participants during the process of 
recruiting and the process of interviewing participants using open-ended questions. The 
interviews were conducted face-to-face with the participants in Nigeria. All participants 
were presented with the same questions, and their open-ended responses enabled me to 
understand the phenomenon as seen by the respondents (see Patton, 2002).  
The environment for the face-to-face interviews was made conducive for the 
participants so that they could respond to the questions in an honest and comprehensive 
manner. The interviews were audio recorded with a reliable recording device. At the end 
of data collection, I transcribed, coded, analyzed, and interpreted the data.  
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No power differential with the participants was expected or existed. I was open to 
gaining an in-depth knowledge from the experiences of the participants and had no 
personal link or interest in the NPF or Borno State that might have led to a biased 
approach to the data collection. The only necessary link for the purposes of this research 
was the gatekeeper I found through my research who assisted me with access to the 
senior government officials in the NPF. I also had no bias due to the genuine goal of this 
study to contribute to the ongoing efforts to devise lasting ways of containing terrorism in 
Nigeria. I had no personal relationship with the research participants. 
Methodology 
The following subsections appear in this section: participant selection and 
sampling strategy, instrumentation and data collection, procedures, and data analysis 
plan. 
Participant Selection and Sampling Strategy 
I used purposive sampling, which is a nonrandom sampling of a larger population, 
to recruit 10 terrorism officials from the NPF in Nigeria. Random sampling provides the 
best opportunity for confident generalization of the results from a random and statistically 
representative sample to a larger population, based on statistical probability theory 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). However, it is not the most effective way of developing an 
understanding of complex issues relating to human behaviors (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
This study involved a case study of an agency in Nigeria involved with countering Boko 
Haram attacks, so generalization was not the goal or expectation; therefore, random 
sampling was unnecessary. 
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Studying information-rich cases yields insights and in-depth understanding rather 
than empirical generalization (Patton, 2002. p. 230). Purposive sampling enables the 
selection of information-rich cases for in-depth study, allowing the researcher to learn a 
great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the research (Patton, 2002, 
p. 230). I conducted purposive sampling for this study using a homogeneous sampling 
strategy to ensure that I drew the participants from similar backgrounds and experiences 
of being senior government officers in the NPF. The homogenous approach to sampling 
helped simplify data analysis because of the similar backgrounds of the participants. 
There are no rules for sample size in qualitative inquiry; rather, the size is 
dependent on the information sought, the purpose, what is useful and credible, and 
considerations for time and resources (Patton, 2002). The qualitative paradigm states that 
useful knowledge can be generated by looking at meaning with small samples (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). Sample size in qualitative research is distinct from quantitative research, 
which uses computations of power analysis to determine a priori minimum numbers and 
kinds of sampling units required to conduct research (Sandelowski, 1995). The goal in 
qualitative research is saturation by sufficiently understanding the phenomena and 
learning enough about it, so mere numbers of participants is irrelevant (Braun & Clarke, 
2006).  
In qualitative research, factors, such as the aim of sampling, type of purposive 
sampling, and the research method employed, help in the consideration and decisions 
about the adequacy of data collected (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The factors also help to 
determine the minimum number and kinds of sampling units required for a research 
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(Sandelowski, 1995). The quality of information obtained in each sampling unit, as 
opposed to the number of units, grounds the logic and power behind the purposeful 
sampling used in a qualitative study (Patton, 1990). An appropriate sample size for a 
qualitative study is one that adequately answers the research questions. 
I based the decision to use 10 participants in this study on the premise that this 
number of participants was adequate to provide sufficient data to answer my research 
questions and achieve saturation. Part of qualitative research includes finding and 
describing patterns, themes, and structures, as well as collecting data until achieving 
informational saturation. A saturation point involves seeing something repeatedly 
(Silverman, 2015). The number of participants was also based on the premise that in-
depth information from a small number of people giving information-rich data is essential 
to the case study approach (see Braun & Clarke, 2006). As earlier noted, participants for 
this study consisted of senior government officials working in the NPF in Nigeria. I 
contacted approximately 15 potential participants who had been identified by my 
gatekeeper as senior government officials in the NPF, with the hope of interviewing 10 
participants for this study. 
I sent invitation letters to recruit potential participants for this study. A copy of 
this letter is found in Appendix B. The decision to contact 15 potential participants took 
into consideration the fact that not all potential participants contacted would agree to take 
part. In addition, it took into consideration the fact that some participants, who may have 
been willing to participate, may have been restricted from participation by other 
circumstances.  
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Instrumentation and Data Collection 
I used a self-designed interview protocol to conduct the in-depth, semistructured 
interviews; this served as the main data collection instrument for this study. The 
interview questions (see Appendix B) were based on the research questions, which were 
developed from the research problem to address the complex phenomena and the 
theoretical framework of the study.  
All the participants were in Nigeria. I endeavored to conduct all the interviews in 
Nigeria within a month. I did not conduct a pilot study to test the interview questions due 
to practical considerations of cost. Although pilot interviews can be valuable in refining 
the interview questions, and, hence, advisable, the inability to conduct a pilot interview 
did not undermine the quality of the interviews or the data collected for the study (see 
Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Procedures for Recruitment 
The protection of research participants is a paramount requirement of any 
research to ensure the avoidance of risk to the participants (Patton, 2002). Following the 
need to understand and adhere to this important requirement, I completed the National 
Institute of Health (NIH), Office of Extramural Research, Protecting Human Research 
Participants training, which was pertinent for my data collection. I collected data for this 
study in a manner consistent with all federal and state regulations in Nigeria relating to 
protecting the identities of participants.  
I applied to the Walden IRB for approval to conduct this study and received 
approval # 11-06-18-0358783. Upon receipt of the IRB’s approval for the study, I e-
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mailed invitation letters to potential participants who had been identified by the 
gatekeeper as senior officials in the NPF who met the selection criteria for this study of 
working in the NPF.  
Prior to the start of the face-to-face interview, I reviewed the consent form with 
each of the participants and they signed the form. The face-to-face interview lasted about 
60 minutes and was audio recorded. Before concluding the interview, I asked the 
participants if they had questions or concerns and, if so, these were addressed. I thanked 
the participants for taking part in the interviews. Participation in the study was not 
expected to cause any serious discomfort to the participants. 
A summary of the report of findings from the study will be e-mailed to all the 
participants. The paper transcripts from the interview was scanned and uploaded onto a 
password protected computer and I am the only person with access to the electronic data. 
The paper transcripts were shredded after they were scanned. The data will be kept for a 
period of 5 years in compliance with the requirements of Walden University. 
Data Analysis Plan 
Detailed description and direct interpretation formed the basis for analyzing the 
data in this study. Patton (2002) identified pattern recognition as one of the competencies 
in thematic analysis. The core elements of qualitative data analysis were employed to 
analyze the data for this study. Braun and Clarke (2006) identified six phases of data 
analysis to include the following: 
1. Familiarizing myself with the data through transcribing the data, rereading the 
data and noting down initial ideas.  
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2. Generating initial codes, which involved the process of coding interesting 
features of the data systematically across the entire data set, and collating data 
relevant to each code and pertaining to the research questions.  
3. Searching for themes which involved the analytical process of collating codes 
into potential themes and gathering all data relevant to each potential theme.  
4. Data analysis relating to reviewing themes by the process of checking if 
themes work in relation to the coded extracts and the entire data set. As well 
as reviewing data to search for additional themes and generating a thematic 
“map’ of the analysis.  
5. Defining and naming themes, which involved the ongoing process of analysis 
to refine the specifics of each theme and the overall story the analysis tells, 
and generating clear definitions and names for each theme.  
6. The final phase of producing the result involved the process of selecting vivid 
and compelling extract examples, final analysis of selected extracts, and 
relating the analysis back to my research questions, objectives, and previously 
reviewed literature (see Braun & Clarke, 2006).  
I used NVivo data analysis software to facilitate storing and organizing the data in 
files that I could access easily and quickly for analysis. The NVivo software facilitated 
the identification of themes and provided annotation for the codes and categories.  
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Issues of Trustworthiness 
In this case study I established validity and reliability by means of credibility, 
transferability, dependability, confirmability and intercoder reliability (see Silverman, 
2015). 
Credibility 
This is the naturalistic equivalent of internal validity which fosters a congruence 
of the findings in the study with reality. This will be established using reflexibility. The 
process of reflexibility will enable me to examine how my subjectivity as a researcher has 
been both a producer and a product of the study. It will ensure that I am accountable to 
the standards of knowing and telling of what I studied. Thick description will necessarily 
be employed to enhance reflexibility and as a way of achieving external validity (see 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  
I also employed triangulation, which involved using multiple sources of data to 
study the issue, comparing, and cross checking the consistency of information derived at 
different times, and by different means (see Patton, 2002, p. 559). Prior to beginning the 
analysis of the data, I ensured that I clarified and set aside all biases. I explicitly stated 
any personal bias that may affect the study and guard against projecting the bias on the 
study.  
Transferability 
I enhanced transferability which refers to the extent the findings in this study can 
be applied to other situations in other parts of Nigeria, through thick description and a 
purposeful selection of participants who are knowledgeable in the field of 
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counterterrorism. My research might apply to other parts of Nigeria such as the Southeast 
areas, rife with civil and armed unrests. The findings could also be applicable to other 
agencies responsible for confronting communal crisis across Nigeria. 
Dependability 
Dependability establishes reliability hence, the processes employed in this study 
was reported in detail to allow a repeat of the process by future researchers. Audit trail 
was adhered to as an important step to documenting all aspects of the study. Efforts to 
enhance reliability included obtaining detailed notes, by employing a good quality tape 
recording for the interviews, and by transcribing the tape to indicate trivial, but often 
crucial pauses and overlaps (see Creswell, 2013, p.253). Different forms of data from the 
audio recordings and transcriptions, were compared for authentication.  
Confirmability 
Confirmability relates to objectivity, it defines how the participants shape the 
findings of the study, rather than the bias or motivation of the researcher. Confirmability 
was enhanced through audit trails and reflexibility, hence any bias I may have, was 
clarified and addressed. Also, intercoder reliability which is based on multiple coders to 
analyze transcript data (Creswell, 2013) was established in NVivo through a consistent 
manner of coding. Many of the same codes were used repeatedly throughout my data set 
to find repetitive patterns of actions and consistencies in human affairs as documented in 
the data (see Saldana, 2015).  
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Informed Consent and Ethical Considerations 
The National Institutes of Health Office of Extramural Research Protecting 
Human Research Participants training is required for data collection. I completed the NIH 
training in compliance with this requirement. I conducted this study following the IRB 
parameters of Walden University, which ensures the ethical protection of research 
participants. I also complied with pertinent federal and state regulations in Nigeria in 
conducting this study. I inquired about the requirement of a permit to conduct research in 
Nigeria and obtained the permit as needed.  
There was no foreseeable risk to the participants in this study. Before I collected 
any data for this study, I mailed a consent form to each participant to obtain their 
permission to take part in this study. Participants’ protections were outlined in the 
consent form, and I adhered to the ethical guidelines for the study, which included such 
stipulations as the voluntary nature of participation in the study, and the right of 
participants to withdrawn from the study at any time without obligation. The consent 
form is attached as Appendix C. There was no foreseeable risk to participants because of 
their participation in this study. There is nothing in the report of the findings in this study 
that can be linked to any participant to enhance their anonymity. 
Summary 
To summarize, this qualitative case study bridged the gap in knowledge of NPF 
through interviews with 10 senior government officials within the NPF, to understand the 
causes of failure in counter-terrorism measures by the Nigerian government in Borno 
State and whether alternative approaches by government security agencies have been 
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considered and not used, or not considered at all to deter the terroristic threat from Boko 
Haram in Borno State. 
 I transcribed the data from the in-depth semistructured interviews and analyzed 
them manually and with the use of NVivo, generated codes, identified and collated 
themes and developed categories. I identified common words and phrases for their 
prevalence, grouping and labelling for coding across categories of inquiry. I compared 
groups of subsets for similarities and differences, to allow for a further search of related 
codes and inferences to form a connection or pattern. 
 I conducted the study in compliance with the IRB parameters of Walden 
University. This ensured adherence to the ethical protection of research participants. I 
followed up on the receipt of mailed signed consent form from each participant with a 
phone call or email to each participant, and scheduled appointment for individual face-to-
face semistructured interview within the one-month period I spent in Nigeria for data 
collection. This was at a location and time suitable for the participant. 
 The face-to-face interview took approximately 60 minutes and I tape recorded the 
interview. The interview questions are attached as Appendix D. Data from the tape 
recording were transcribed and securely kept. The data were shared only with members 
of my dissertation committee. Following Walden University’s requirements, I will keep 
the data for a period of 5 years. I provided my contact information to the participants, as 
well as the representative at Walden University, with whom they can talk privately about 
their participant rights. A summary report of the research findings will be e-mailed to the 
participants after receiving final approval of the dissertation. 
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Chapter 4: Results  
The extremist Islamist group Boko Haram unleashed a campaign of violence on 
the Nigerian populace in its target of innocent and unsuspecting individuals considered 
by the group as engaged in un-Islamic activities (Forest, 2012). Churches, Christians, 
Muslim clerics, strategic government agencies, and politicians were not spared in the 
spate of attacks (Forest, 2012). While Boko Haram’s rationale for its attacks on these 
groups may be understandable, its justification for striking at Muslim clerics was 
confounding, and the failures of the Nigerian government to decisively contain the group 
was troubling. In Chapter 4, I present the data analysis and findings in response to the 
research questions.  
Research Setting 
Upon obtaining approval from the Walden University IRB, I proceeded to contact 
the participants through e-mail to set up interview dates convenient for the participants. I 
ensured, however, that the dates were close enough to enable completion of all the 
interviews within the month I spent in Nigeria for data collection. I conducted face-to-
face interviews at a time and place that was convenient for each participant, which was at 
a private location of their choice in Abuja, known only to the participants and me. The 
interviews lasted approximately 1 hour. No organizational conditions influenced the 
participants or their experiences at the time of the study that may have influenced 
interpretation of the study results.  
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Demographics 
I sought diverse perspectives on the topic of study from the participants who had 
investigated and worked in the field of counterterrorism. The demographic breakdown of 
the participants appears in Table 1. 
Table 1 
 
Basic Demographics of the Participants in the Study 
Participants  Gender Education Field Location 
Participant 1 M College Terrorism Abuja 
Participant 2 M College Terrorism Abuja 
Participant 3 M College Terrorism Abuja 
Participant 4 M Post College Terrorism Abuja 
Participant 5 M College Terrorism Abuja 
Participant 6 M College Terrorism Abuja 
Participant 7 M Post College Terrorism Abuja 
Participant 8 M College Terrorism Abuja 
Participant 9 M College Terrorism Abuja 
Participant 10 M Post College Terrorism Abuja 
 
 
Data Collection 
After receiving IRB approval, I contacted the participants by e-mail and sent them 
the invitation letters. Out of the 15 participants who were contacted, 10 agreed to 
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participate in the study. The 10 participants were senior government officials in the NPF 
with expertise in the fight against terrorism. I collected data from all 10 participants in 
face-to-face interviews. All the face-to-face interviews were audio recorded and took 
approximately 60 minutes (see Appendix D for interview questions). I reviewed the 
consent form with each of the participants and had them sign the form prior to the start of 
each face-to-face interview. 
It is pertinent to provide an explanation of an important change in the agency 
proposed and approved for use in this research effort. The agency approved in the 
proposal for data collection was the DIA; however, shortly before applying for IRB 
approval, in the course of trying to obtain a letter of cooperation from the DIA, I was 
advised that I would not be able to use the DIA for data collection. Based on this reality, I 
sought an alternate agency involved in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria. I secured the 
cooperation of the NPF, and this was approved by the IRB for data collection with the 
knowledge of my committee members.   
Data Analysis 
In this section, I present relevant information from excerpts of the interviews with 
study participants. In this case study, the analysis of data collected was crucial to finding 
meaning within the phenomenon studied. To ensure anonymity of the participants and to 
ease identification of the participants’ responses to the research question, I assigned the 
codes of P1 through P10 to each of the participants. This eliminated any criticism of 
nondisclosure of methods used in the study and legitimized the study results.  
75 
 
I used the core elements of qualitative data analysis for this study. Braun and 
Clarke (2006) identified six phases of data analysis. In the first phase, I transcribed the 
recorded, face-to-face interviews with each of the 10 participants verbatim, generated 
unfiltered raw data files, carefully read through the raw data, and noted down initial 
codes. In the second phase, I reviewed each participant’s raw data file; corrected 
grammatical errors; and eliminated overlapping, repetitive, and vague expressions or 
presented them in more descriptive terms in order to streamline the content and make 
them concise and appropriate for the next round of reviews. In the third round, I searched 
participants’ responses, collated codes into themes, and gathered all data including words 
and meanings projected by the participants that were relevant to each theme. To complete 
this process, I created a table, in Microsoft Excel, that showed participant codes as 
columns and the interview questions as rows. This visual approach allowed for easy 
comparison of the 10 responses provided by each participant, and it enhanced the process 
of identifying and highlighting a preliminary list of the common themes, factors, and key 
points for each of the participants. I collated data relevant to each code that pertained to 
the research questions. In the fourth phase, I imported the participant data into NVivo 
data analysis software to check if the identified themes worked in relation to the coded 
extracts and the entire data set. I also used the software to search for additional themes 
and to generate a thematic map of the analysis. In the fifth phase, I developed a list of the 
general themes of the study and refined the specifics of each theme as related to the 
overall story in the analysis. I compiled the general themes into the following list: 
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  Denial of the gravity of the Boko Haram’s insurgency during the early stages; 
 Haphazard, disjointed, ineffective, and uncoordinated response to Boko Haram 
insurgency;  
 Overreliance on the application of kinetic force to recover physical territories; 
 Use of hard power/maximum force; 
 Use of soft power/deradicalization/reorientation; 
 Trials of hardened criminals; 
 Lack of military experience with counterterrorism but skilled in conventional 
warfare; 
 Commitment to develop relationships; 
 Winning hearts and minds/buy-in; 
 Allow the states to have their own separate police force or community policing; 
 Introduce a national identification scheme/create a Department of Vital Records 
(DVR); 
 Interagency cooperation; 
 Invest in a massive infrastructural development program; 
 Resources for the military/military morale; 
77 
 
  Cooperation/collaboration with neighbors; 
 Use of mercenaries; 
 An all-out military strategy similar to that used in Sri Lanka against the Tamil 
Tigers; 
 Government sincerity and transparency; 
 No negotiating with the terrorists and nonpayment of ransom to kidnappers; 
 Targeted killings of opposition leaders; 
 Intelligence to counteract Boko Haram; 
 Reducing terrorist activities; 
 Illiteracy/unemployment/poverty/distrust; 
 Military containment of Boko Haram; 
 Conspiracy of silence regarding sponsors; 
 Countering Boko Haram’s propaganda using Islamic principles; 
 Using government security agencies to mount a counternarrative against Boko 
Haram;  
 Political will to effectuate difficult political, morale, and ethical decisions; 
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  Ability to block Boko Haram funding sources; and 
 Constitutional amendment to allow a state of emergency or martial law. 
 
In the sixth and final phase of data analysis, I selected vivid and compelling 
extract examples facilitated by the juxtaposition of the research questions with the 
empirical data that emerged from the themes; performed final analysis of selected 
extracts; and related the analysis back to my research questions, objectives, and 
previously reviewed literature (see Braun & Clarke, 2006). The NVivo software 
facilitated the identification of themes and provided annotation for the codes and 
categories. The combination of the NVivo data analysis software and the Excel 
spreadsheet were used to organize and store the data in files used for the data analysis.  
The analysis of the data from interviews produced six categories of themes that 
were informed by the responses of the 10 participants interviewed. The themes emerged 
from the combination of broad or general approaches to narrow or targeted approaches 
employed by the Nigerian government. The approaches were categorized as: general 
counterterrorist approaches; counterterrorist approaches considered but not used; 
counterterrorist approaches not considered at all; targeted approaches, which include 
threats or punishments, targeted killing as a counterterrorism strategy, and targeting 
sponsors to undermine Boko Haram; exploitation of cultural values to hinder Boko 
Haram’s activities; and efforts to bring Boko Haram to extinction. The categorized 
approaches are presented in more details in the following subsections. 
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General Counterterrorism Approaches 
The Nigerian government denied the gravity of the Boko Haram’s insurgency 
during the early stages. The political denial was evidenced in a counterterrorism approach 
that participants categorized as haphazard, disjointed, ineffective, and uncoordinated in 
mitigating and addressing the fundamental causes of Boko Haram insurgency. Others 
referred to the government’s efforts as unfocused and lackluster. The government’s initial 
strategy to kill the leader was a key miscalculation because it backfired and incited many 
people to join Boko Haram instead of the expected outcome, which was to eliminate the 
group. 
The government used a combination of hard and soft counterterrorism measures. 
The hard measures included a highly militarized approach that depended on kinetic force 
and an overreliance on the application of maximum force in efforts to recover physical 
territories occupied by Boko Haram or to obliterate the group altogether. It also included 
engagement in confrontation to degrade or decimate Boko Haram’s weaponry and 
operational activities in their bases. Confrontation remained the only known approach by 
the military. The soft measures involved activities broadly aimed at winning the hearts 
and minds of the people to discourage their involvement with Boko Haram, which 
included engagement, empowerment, deradicalization, building trust, resilience, religious 
tolerance and community engagements through awareness campaigns, and using security 
agencies to strategically communicate national values and thereby counter Boko Haram’s 
deceptive narratives. Other soft measures included trials of hardened criminals, military 
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containment, and addressing the economic and root causes of terrorism through an 
economic revitalization program. 
Counterterrorism Approaches Considered But Not Used 
The government was faced with a crisis that it was ill equipped to address from a 
political and military perspective. The military was skilled in conventional warfare; 
however, it had no experience with unconventional warfare such as counterterrorism. The 
political leadership also floundered in its efforts to address this issue, which was fueled 
by basic socio-economic inequalities that seemed localized and inconspicuous at first. As 
a result, the government considered a number of counterterrorist approaches but did not 
use them for a variety of reasons.  
One of the approaches considered but not used was to allow the states to have 
their own separate police force. This approach would give more autonomy to state 
governors over postings and deployment of the commissioner of police. This approach 
would be synergized with different quasi-police formations or community policing or the 
vigilante/area watch groups to report suspicious movements and activities in a timely 
fashion. Such groups would require a clear strategy to minimize collateral damage.  
Yet another approach was to introduce a comprehensive national identification 
scheme that would identify each individual by name and residence as well as make 
registration of place of new residence mandatory to monitor new arrivals or relocations. 
Similarly, the government would create a DVR where births, marriages and death were 
automatically registered and updated. To ensure the success of the DVR, the government 
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would promote freedom of information and bring better clarity to government operations 
to secure buy-in by the citizenry.  
Another approach which was considered but not used was for the government to 
invest in massive infrastructural development program to build schools, roads, hospitals 
and give incentives to farmers to address poverty, which was the fundamental cause of 
the Boko Haram insurgency. A similar approach was the deployment of resources to train 
the youth, encourage dialog among various religions, and to rehabilitate insurgents who 
have surrendered. 
A counterterrorist approach that was considered but not used was the use of 
mercenaries. The government received offers from South African to fight Boko Haram, 
but the offer was rejected. An all-out military strategy similar to that used in Sri Lanka 
against the Tamil Tigers (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) and in Columbia against the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia rebels was also considered but not used. The 
all-out military approach was not implemented because of lack of capacity, lack of 
credible intelligence, lack of political will and lack of honest intentions on the part of the 
government. Another approach which was not implemented due to lack of political will 
was the naming of identified sponsors of Boko Haram. The Nigerian office of national 
security’s deradicalization program and policy framework on preventing and countering 
extremism was not implemented. An approach involving the reorientation of former 
members who surrendered was also not implemented. Another approach with a similar 
theme was to establish schools for idle youth and to engage Malaams and Emirs to 
reorient former members. Experts believe that the government needed to find a long-term 
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future approach besides using the Malaams and the Emirs to speak to those who were 
fully involved. 
Counterterrorist Approaches Not Considered at All 
One of the counterterrorist approaches not considered at all was negotiating with 
the terrorists at least on the surface. Similarly, the non-payment of ransom poses a serious 
dilemma for the government, which follows the U.S government that does not pay 
ransom as a matter of policy even though it was allowed. Next approach was the 
infiltration of the rank and file of Boko Haram that was extremely dangerous. Boko 
Haram was able to effectively infiltrate the Nigerian army, while the government hasn’t 
been able to do the same. The government had not optimized the lessons and ideas gained 
from the multinational workshops regarding leveraging its relationships with neighbors 
like Cameroon, Niger, Mali, and Niger. The government had done very little to secure 
better understanding and cooperation of these neighbors regarding insurgency. 
Additionally, the government had not made any effort to understand Boko Haram’s 
affiliation with ISIS to solicit cooperation on how to target this group.  
On the issue of funding, the government failed to identify the sources of funding 
towards identifying, naming, shaming sponsors and punishing them. Another 
counterterrorist approaches which was not considered at all was a constitutional 
amendment to allow a state of emergency or martial law. The government could 
legitimately declare a state of emergency, impose martial law and do things that it could 
not do in peace time. The government needed to realize that it was in a state of war and 
not deny it. Targeted killing as a counterterrorist approach had not been considered. Israel 
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had done that effectively against Hamas and Hezbollah and the United States had 
successfully employed this strategy against Al Qaeda. The government was not deploying 
enough resources to trace the sources of these funding in order to stop the inflow and deal 
with those sponsoring the terrorist activities. The government was not making any efforts 
to identify those sponsoring terrorist organizations. The insurgents were being supported 
by some groups and there were suspicions that some of those were in the country. A lot 
of funding was coming from outside as well.  
Threats or Punishments 
The government’s use of excessive force had not worked even though the 
government had used it consistently but had not reevaluated the poor outcomes produced 
by this approach. The government was unable to maintain its alliances with the local 
governments because it had failed to acknowledge its ineffective measures of lack of 
sustained efforts after reclaiming an area from Boko Haram. The threat of force had not 
worked because it gives Boko Haram the opportunity to video such incidents and use 
them as propaganda material to incite more violence. Boko Haram was a double-edged 
sword because it was still holding some of the Chibok girls and the Dapchi girl (Leah). 
The government agencies lack the training and intelligence to capture Boko Haram 
leaders as a form of retaliation. The lack of proper training of agencies involved in the 
fight against Boko Haram, was a major constraint on the Nigerian government. 
Instead of using threat or punishment to influence Boko Haram, the Nigerian 
government had used it as a political weapon either to remove a government or to solidify 
the power base of the government in power. Similarly, the opposition uses the issue to 
84 
 
attack and criticize the government in power. The threat of force had not worked because 
the government was not making effective use of the budget provided for that approach. 
And there was also the reported bias and selective approach in assigning soldiers, and 
military personnel who go to the war front; there have been reports of getting only those 
from some particular sections of the country to go to the warfront, while they post those 
from the center of the warfront (Northeast) to the Southeast and other areas where there 
was relative peace, and this really affected the morale of the soldiers. “If I know, for 
instance, that you were sending me to the warfront because I am from a certain area, a 
particular zone of the country, I would not be committed.” This was part of the issue; 
there was a lack of morale which led to a lack of patriotism or nationalism.  
There was no threat of punishment because death was business as usual for Boko 
Haram soldiers and they looked forward to it, because they have been brainwashed to 
believe that they would go to heaven and be married to virgins and drink water from them 
after they died. Boko Haram was completely misguided on this notion of Islam. 
Consequently, threatening them with punishment was not effective. This notion also 
weakened the argument that annihilation and assassination were viable strategic options. 
This also made it difficult for the government to use threats or punishment as a deterrent 
because Boko Haram soldiers were willing to die for their cause. The Nigerian 
government’s use of threat or punishment to influence, had no effect on Boko Haram’s 
behavior and had escalated its disposition to violence. The killing of the founder 
Mohammed Yussuf caused his successor, Shekau, to adopt a more brutal approach. For 
example, after the Yobe state governor gave the police force armored personnel vehicles, 
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the former IG of police Hafsat Ringin boasted about obliterating Boko Haram within a 
month. Boko Haram responded to the threat by bombing the police headquarters, the first 
of such major attacks in Abuja, a clear indication that empty threats embolden Boko 
Haram to commit even more violence.  
Targeted Killing as A Counterterrorism Strategy 
Responses from interview participants regarding targeted killing as a 
counterterrorism strategy were as varied as they were contradictory. One view 
highlighted the need to consider targeted killing because Israel had done that effectively 
against Hamas and Hezbollah and the technology was available as a result, the Nigerian 
government should seek help and leverage this advanced technology. The response from 
another participant suggested that the Nigerian government had not targeted anybody, 
because if they did, Shekau would have been eliminated many years ago. Previous 
incidents of targeted killing seemed to be more by chance or due to wrong information. 
Targeted killing required credible information and Boko Haram operatives appeared 
better than the Nigerian officials at collaborating and partnering with the local 
community. This method was being used substantially through foreign intelligence and 
also through the Nigerian Air Force. Shekau was wounded in a targeted attack. However, 
it must be pointed out that Boko Haram members were not located solely in the forest, 
but they live in the communities. Occasionally, the Nigerian government also took the 
source of their intelligence into account and factored in the potential for collateral 
damage. 
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Targeted killing required the right tools and resources. Boko Haram was still 
holding hostages, some from Chibok. If the Nigerian government had good intelligence 
that would facilitate targeted killing, then it should leverage that resource. For example, 
the Trump government had used the latest tools and intelligence to attack ISIS. The 
Nigerian government lacked the resources for targeted killing partly because some 
government officials diverted the funds allocated for weapons, towards their private 
needs and left the soldiers to die in the battlefields. Targeted killing was nothing new the 
Air Force had used it on a limited basis. Conversely, Boko Haram employs mercenaries 
from Libya and other places working with them. They kidnapped the Chibok girls and 
other victims and used them as human shields in order to discourage any attempts to 
bomb them in their hideout in the forest. Although the Nigerian government officials 
made false claims, it was believed that they possessed some intelligence which could not 
be overlooked. Targeted killing only served to displace Boko Haram but not much else. 
The Nigerian fighting force was dispirited, and the government’s attack had been 
random rather than targeted. The morale of the military was low because they were ill 
equipped. The war had been politicized by the military brass who used strikes to justify 
the need for funding which they divert to enrich themselves. Targeted killing was 
effective when the right people were identified and eliminated and this required proper 
use of intelligence, which was multilateral or bilateral and not unilateral. The Nigerian 
government needed to have dossiers on commanders. They needed to know the names of 
Boko Haram’s leaders, organizational structure, their sponsors and how they operate. 
Targeted killing was also impacted by the lack of cooperation with the neighboring 
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countries where Boko Haram soldiers seek refuge. Effective use of intelligence would 
stop Boko Haram from crossing the borders into the neighboring countries after 
committing crimes in Nigeria. A contrasting response from a participant about targeted 
killings indicated that targeted killing, unlike what the Israel Defense Forces does in 
Israel was not recommended because Boko Haram soldiers were Nigerian citizens who 
have gone astray. The government’s approach should be towards reorientation and not to 
kill them. The participant agreed that getting killed in battle was however legal and 
internationally sanctioned. 
Targeting Sponsors to Undermine Boko Haram’s Funding 
Part of the government’s counterterrorism effort to undermine Boko Haram was 
to cut off the sources of Boko Haram’s funding and one of the ways to accomplish this 
was for the government not to agree to financial negotiations with Boko Haram, since it 
requires the government to pay substantial sums of money to Boko Haram, even though it 
had been done quietly in the past. Payouts to Boko Haram were terminated because such 
transactions enabled the group to acquire more weaponry thereby becoming more 
forceful and lethal. Payouts were not just a Nigerian phenomenon; the United Nations, 
Europe and other Western countries were impacted by this because terrorism does not 
have a border. Another counter-terrorism method used by the government to target 
sponsors was intelligence, infiltration, monitoring movement of funds, arms, financial 
institutions and border control. The Nigerian borders were porous; people, arms and 
ammunition flow through the borders with relative ease and Boko Haram soldiers use 
these borders because they know that the borders were virtually unmanned. It was 
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impossible to target sponsors without having any credible information about them. There 
was a conspiracy of silence about the sponsors. It appears the government officials knew 
who the sponsors were, but they were reluctant to name them.  
The government needed to have intelligence to monitor the whereabouts of Boko 
Haram and use a people-centered approach by way of informants who could provide 
leads. As a nation with significant influence, especially in this subregion of Africa, 
Nigeria needed to leverage its relationships with Cameroon, Chad and Niger and 
discourage them from providing safe havens for Boko Haram. Another approach was for 
the government to take decisive actions in publicly naming Boko Haram sponsors, some 
of whom the government bounced around in the past but nothing ever happened because 
most of them were politicians. The government needed to determine whether to allow 
partisan considerations to influence the attitudes of its officials because Boko Haram had 
sponsors within the political class. The government had to exercise the political will to 
prosecute these sponsors, so that the public would take note of its actions instead of 
government officials taking bribes from perpetrators and allowing them to go free and 
continue with their actions. The government also needed to improve diplomatic ties with 
Libya and to get more information on Boko Haram’s funding sources and strategies 
through the banks.  
Financing of terrorism was a key issue because Boko Haram’s operational 
capacity would be severely limited if the government was able to cut off their sources of 
supply. If the government was serious about crippling Boko Haram, it must target the 
supply of ammunition and the supply of funds. The military was not doing a good job of 
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identifying sponsors. There had been a lot of distraction and a lack of sincere and focused 
strong will regarding the handling of sponsors and targets. The government needed to 
emphasize motivation and increase the morale of the military by supplying them with the 
best equipment. Efforts to gather domestic and external intelligence have to be stepped 
up. One of the ways to do this was through partnership and collaboration with other 
foreign intelligence organizations who could tell us about Boko Haram’s sponsors and 
how we could legislatively cut off such funding sources. Boko Haram was believed to 
have external sponsors in addition to the internal ones. These include Islamic group in 
West Africa and ISIS, since Boko Haram had pledged allegiance to ISIS.  
Efforts to Delegitimize Boko Haram in The Current Social System 
The effort to delegitimize Boko Haram was time consuming but ultimately it was 
one of the best solutions. This counterterrorism effort involves the government partnering 
with all the preachers, all the Muslim scholars, including those that were genuine and 
understand the tenets of the Koran and those that were not genuine because they do not 
understand the real message of the Koran. The government must regulate what was 
preached and what was taught in the Muslim schools. As a matter of policy, the 
government must also create a narrative that would counteract those preached by Boko 
Haram, in order to keep the latter from gaining the upper hand. There was a dissonance 
between Boko Haram’s uncompromising demand for an Islamic state and the legal 
stipulations of Nigerian law which makes Boko Haram’s demands illegitimate.  
The government was engaged in an ideological war. It needed to take steps to 
understand its people and to understand that the level of poverty, corruption and 
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degradation was caused primarily by western education and the elites. As a result, the 
government needed to augment its application of soft measures and work with the 
religious organizations and the private sectors to create jobs for unemployed youths and 
to lessen their attraction and vulnerability to groups like Boko Haram. 
Boko Haram’s initial strategy was to attack the symbols that cause hardship to the 
country and to attack the police and the military. Boko Haram’s original leader earned the 
trust of the people by providing water and some basic needed for them. This explained 
why his assassination exacerbated the situation. The government must go back to 
education, not just Western education. The government needed to secure the buy-in of its 
people by galvanizing society and by having a Nigerian-centric view about the country’s 
security issues. The current government antagonized people in the Northeast against the 
military and it took a long time to officially brand Boko Haram as a terrorist organization. 
The current president, who was the head of opposition at the time, equated the declaration 
of state of emergency to declaring war against the north and ignited protests by the 
Northern Elders Forum and Borno Elders Forum against then Chief of Army Staff who 
was Ibo, in the eastern part of Nigeria.  
The insurgency polarized the country along pro-government and anti-government 
factions and resulted in a loss of support for, and detachment from, the Nigerian-centric 
view of the warfare. The Nigerian citizens became ambivalent about the attacks. The 
government did not conduct national burials of victims to galvanize public support, 
national anger or emotion against Boko Haram attacks. The government needed to create 
public symbols and imagery instead of secret burials. To date, there was no clarity of the 
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grievances, and the issues that would constitute the framework for negotiation. For 
example, the government does not know if Boko Haram’s objective was to Islamize 
Nigeria or to abolish western education completely and both sides were facing a case of 
winner-take-all.  
The current government also bears responsibility for promoting the dangerous 
policy of deradicalization, which allows reabsorbing Boko Haram soldiers into the 
Nigerian Army and thereby giving Boko Haram the official stamp to act from within the 
army. On the contrary, excombatants could be turned informants for use against Boko 
Haram’s leadership. Another issue was whether the government was serious enough 
about confronting Boko Haram. The Nigerian military was overwhelmed and troop 
morale was low because the terrorists were better equipped militarily. Leaders were 
playing politics and engaging in grand corruption with the lives of the Nigerian military. 
Leaders needed to address the issue of diversion of funds meant for fighting against 
terrorism. The government needed to counter corruption and offer a better alternative.  
The Nigerian government could delegitimize Boko Haram in the current social 
system and bring them to the negotiating table by neutralizing or stopping Boko Haram’s 
strategies for mass recruitment, establishing schemes that empowered people, creating 
effective administrative structures, developing counter narratives, and countering 
brainwashing. The government needed to develop counter narratives in a manner that 
would reduce Boko Haram’s recruitment efforts and make it easier for members to leave 
the group. Developing a counter narrative was important because members do not know 
any other narrative other than what they were being told. It had been reported that some 
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of the Chibok girls have said they do not want to come out, that they were happy and 
even if they were released, they would return to their husbands. For example, a young 
man who had been told that he could not have sex, suddenly finds a religious group that 
tells him that he could legitimately have it. Boko Haram uses this approach for mass 
recruitment of young men. The group also offers interest free loans that allows members 
to buy two or three local transport vehicles to generate income, thereby affording 
members the flexibility and motivation to participate in activities. Boko Haram had also 
created a parallel state and local government structure through which they organize and 
conduct their activities. The Nigerian government had failed to undermine any of these 
strategies. 
Another approach that the government could use to delegitimize Boko Haram was 
to engage in the installation of social infrastructure like; schools, hospitals, farm 
settlements, food subsidy and gainful employment, to uplift the social standard of the 
people and ensure the safety of people returning to their homes destroyed by Boko 
Haram. This could also involve creating avenues that could engage the youth in skills 
acquisition, leisure, and open spaces for recreation, parks, game facilities and programs 
that could occupy free time of the people and demonstrate to the local people that life 
without Boko Haram was far better. 
Finally, Boko Haram could be delegitimized through the application of a cocktail 
of measures that include but not limited to the need of the Nigerian government to cut off 
the supply of funds, supply routes or channels for food and fuel for Boko Haram. Cutting 
off funds, water, medical attention and food was synonymous with cutting off the oxygen 
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that feeds the insurgents. It was believed that there would be a lot of defectors if the 
government was able to effectively squeeze Boko Haram in these areas. Demolishing the 
habitation of any confirmed member of Boko Haram could be effective if properly 
implemented to avoid implicating people who might be falsely accused. Another way to 
delegitimize was to embark on massive military campaigns over a sustained period. To 
do this the government must wage a sustained war of aerial bombardment that ensures 
that the band of terrorists never have a resting place.  
Exploitation of Cultural Values to Hinder Boko Haram’s Activities 
The exploitation of cultural values to hinder Boko Haram’s activities involves 
strategies like culture and religion, used as strategies to delegitimize Boko Haram. 
Religion and ethnicity were major problems for the country. Boko Haram was promoting 
the notion that western education was haram, dangerous and wants to declare a theocracy. 
The Islamic religion does not permit the killing of fellow citizens. The government had to 
challenge the notion of violence in the Koran and highlight the absence of this point in 
the various sections of the Koran and present it in different languages as part of its 
propaganda. More importantly, the government needed to focus on the correct 
interpretation of the Koran and dissemination of Islam, and create better awareness of the 
positive aspects of Islam that emphasized knowledge, science and technology which 
proved that Islam was really the historical foundation of modern technology, of algebra 
and mathematics. Religion should be treated as a personal matter and the government 
should have no business sponsoring people to go on pilgrimage to pray because of the 
deleterious effect of religion on the country.  
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The government could exploit cultural values to hinder Boko Haram’s activities 
through the use of soft power and hard power approaches aimed at winning the hearts and 
minds of the people by providing education, jobs, getting people involved, providing 
healthcare, job skills, investments, poverty alleviation, and good governance. Another 
soft measure was to educate people to embrace the notion that human life was sacrosanct 
and should not be taken away. This needed to be emphasized in the Islamic forum 
because it was a huge issue. This would foster respect for the dignity of the human person 
and respect for the independent views of others. Nigeria is a pluralistic, multiethnic, 
multicultural, and multireligious society with different beliefs such as Christianity, Islam, 
traditional worship, and Atheism. More importantly, Boko Haram members needed to 
realize that, regardless of their negative tendencies, the society still loved them and would 
be glad for them to drop their arms and come to the negotiating table, so that this issue 
could be resolved and the people could continue to live in peace. “On its own, peace was 
a value; let us live in peace and also let us believe that with what Boko Haram was doing 
that part of the country could never be developed,” said one of the participants. 
The love of money had resulted in a significant erosion of values in Nigeria. 
Parents helped their children to engage in exam malpractice and other dishonest 
behaviors. Teachers who enforced fairness were threatened when they were in public. 
These were the root causes of loss of values. To change the Nigerian psyche, the 
government needed to go back to the family structure, to society and the church. Even in 
the church, there was a case of a priest whose conduct was undesirable and brought 
public shame to his church and undermined the values it should uphold. There was also, 
95 
 
an instance of a Nigerian senator who was caught with drugs. The country’s values 
continued to deteriorate that no news could be shocking anymore. People with upright 
values and morals never succeeded; those involved in shady stuff did. Whatever was 
previously thought of as taboo was happening. The government needed a fresh start and it 
needed leadership because there was a complete absence of leadership in Nigeria. The 
leaders were not leading by example. They were not doing what they said, what they 
preached in churches, mosques, in schools, the lecturers are not taken seriously, the 
politicians fail to observe the law that they enacted, the executives contravene the law 
that they were supposed to observe, consequently, these people could not talk to the 
citizens about violence or obedience to laws. 
Arguably, the love of money and material things was the important socio-
economic challenge that the government faced and the issue of poverty was the cause of 
disaffection. The kind of abject poverty in the north eastern part of the country was the 
worst in terms of human indexes: low literacy, child mortality, and lack of education. 
Boko Haram saw elite education as a problem because if most of the elite were the ones 
that were in power and were not affecting the lives of the less privileged positively, it was 
simply easy for the people to see it as a problem. The leadership of Boko Haram were 
people in the community; they saw that the elite suddenly become affluent after they 
assumed government positions; as a result, when Boko Haram promised impoverished 
people a better life, they believed the former.  
One of the ways for the government to advocate good values within the Nigerian 
society was to foster a Nigerian spirit such as selflessness and to gain the buy-in from the 
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people. The value of selflessness makes the society great. In Western countries, people 
volunteered to go to the warfront “Country first,” “self-second.” Sacrifice was an 
important value. This was not the case in Nigeria where one questioned the value of 
sacrifice. The government could use values such as mass public enlightenment, provision 
of amenities, regular supply of power, social engineering, crop support, financial aid, and 
other people-oriented measures to exploit Boko Haram’s activities, erode its recruitment 
base and, over a period of time, enhance a return to normalcy. The massive and quick 
rebuilding of infrastructure and the restoration of normalcy would trigger a gradual 
restoration of confidence for the displaced and encourage them to go home. 
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
Credibility 
In Chapter 3, I explained the need to adequately provide evidence of 
trustworthiness in the process of a qualitative study. This is predicated on credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability in a qualitative inquiry. I used audiotape 
recorder to ensure credibility of data recorded for this study. After the interview, I 
provided the participants with a summary of all the discussions during the interview to 
confirm that their views were accurately captured.  
Transferability 
To ensure transferability, I purposefully selected the participants based on their 
knowledge of the subject of this inquiry. I was precise and accurate in recording the 
responses of the participants to each interview question using a tape recorder. 
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Dependability 
To achieve dependability, I maintained field notes in my reflective journal to keep 
a log of dates, times, places, persons and activities. I was the only one who had access to 
the participants, and secured data collected with the audio recorder in a lock safe and 
allowed no one else access to it.  
Confirmability 
I engaged the participants in informal interactions at various times after the 
interview before leaving Nigeria, as a process of member checking, to obtain the 
accuracy of data collected during the interview.  
Study Results 
Each of the 10 participants provided their assessment of the effectiveness of the 
various counterterrorism approaches used by the Nigerian government to address the 
Boko Haram insurgency. They were also asked to provide their assessments of the 
counterterrorism approaches that were effective or successful, that were ineffective or 
failed, as well as those that were ongoing, had mixed results or required longer evaluation 
periods. A summary of the participants’ overall assessments of the counterterrorism 
approaches employed by the Nigerian government is shown in Table 2, which indicated 
how participants assessed each of the themes that were highlighted under the various 
counterterrorism approaches employed by the Nigerian government. Even though all the 
participants were asked the same questions during the interviews, yet their responses 
were based on their local expertise and their direct or indirect involvement in various 
aspects of the Boko Haram counterterrorism efforts. Consequently, each participant’s 
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overall assessment addressed the specific themes or approaches that they highlighted in 
their responses. Not surprisingly, some participants rated some approaches as effective 
while others rated those same approaches as ineffective or ongoing. A review of the 
results showed that the counterterrorism approaches used by the Nigerian government 
were ineffective. The following section provides specific reasons for the failure of the 
counterterrorism approaches used by the Nigerian government.  
Political Approach 
The political approach to the Boko Haram issue was ineffective because it failed 
to address the issues of the Northeast. There was a lack of national approach in 
addressing the problem of Boko Haram because the military and political leaderships 
view it as a regional issue and not a national issue. 
The Hard Measure Approach 
Using maximum or kinetic force by the military did not work because it was 
applicable to conventional warfare but inappropriate in an insurgency situation. The hard 
power approach by the Nigerian military had not been effective because the battle with 
Boko Haram was not a conventional war. The halfhearted approaches have not been 
effective due to a combination of factors at the national, regional and multilateral levels. 
At the national level, the military lacked effective equipment; at the regional level, there 
was a lack of cooperation and collaboration among the neighboring countries and the 
military. The military recently lost over 100 soldiers in an attack by Boko Haram, which 
indicated a failure of military containment of Boko Haram. Significant progress or 
improvement had been realized using a highly militarized approach which depended on 
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kinetic force; however, the government’s estimation of the progress was overestimated 
and there was far more work to be done. The failures could be attributed to 
overdependence on the military, a lack of political will and the politicization of 
counterinsurgency operations which polarized the society that needed to unite behind the 
government.  
There was also a lack of actionable intelligence which put the terrorists ahead of 
the military efforts. There was a lack of cooperation from the neighboring countries 
reluctant to sign onto the hot-pursuit agreement thereby providing safe haven for Boko 
Haram soldiers. The hard measure military approach had not been very effective due to 
lack of needed intelligence and resources. The military established a regional intelligence 
fusion unit to collect intelligence from Nigerian agencies as well as intelligence agencies 
from the neighboring countries, but that had not been employed effectively. 
Consequently, Boko Haram continued to launch attacks. The failures of these approaches 
included inadequate provision of educational and employment opportunities for the 
youth, which made them vulnerable to recruitment efforts by Boko Haram. The influence 
of international terrorist organizations and the unrestrained movement of ISIS fighters to 
Mali and Nigeria, coupled with the ease with which Boko Haram was able to acquire 
arms through Libya all worsened an already volatile situation.  
Soft Measure Approach 
The deradicalization, building trust, resilience, religious tolerance and community 
engagements through awareness campaigns, were not particularly successful because of 
lack of government capacity and transparency in implementing the instituted policies. 
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The engagement approach had been ineffective because Boko Haram was amorphous and 
anonymous. The approach of empowerment which addressed the root causes of poverty 
and unemployment, would require years of implementation to prove its effectiveness in 
addressing Boko Haram issues. The participants did not address effectiveness of 
prosecuting hardened criminals. The approach of military containment had shown mixed 
results. Boko Haram was declared technically defeated and degraded; however, a 
resurgence of attacks at various villages in Borno and Yobe states against the military, 
resulted in military casualties and indicated that military containment had not succeeded.  
Additionally, Boko Haram continued to occupy largely ungoverned areas in 
Borno state. The current strategy to win the hearts and minds of the people was an 
ongoing effort. Another cause of the failures of the approaches related to the lack of inter-
agency cooperation among the security agencies. The soft measure approach of 
empowerment had not been successful to achieve reorientation and deradicalization as 
evidenced by the suicide bombings involving women and the kidnapping of young girls. 
Engagement had not been successful because the ransom paid to secure the release of 
kidnapped victims was recycled by Boko Haram to purchase arms and recruit new 
members. 
The Causes of Failures 
These were multifaceted because the government had not been fully committed to 
implementing its approaches. The lack of commitment by the military to develop 
relationship with the community was partly responsible for the military’s indiscriminate 
response to attacks which caused the community to turn against them. Another reason for 
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the failure of the approaches by the government included an unacceptable level of 
casualties in the counterterrorism efforts. Only recently, the military lost over 100 
soldiers in an attack by Boko Haram. This was partly because of Boko Haram’s ability to 
disguise themselves in military uniforms and enter military barracks, an indication of 
failure of military intelligence. The failures were also due to a lack of sincerity and 
transparency on the part of the government in truthfully communicating the results of its 
efforts.  
Counterterrorism approaches have been ineffective because of a catalogue of 
“disjointed incrementalism.” One success recorded by the military was followed by 
multiple failures resulting from successful Boko Haram attacks, due to unfamiliarity with 
the local terrain, short deployment stays and lack of adequate equipment. The failures of 
the approaches could be attributed to lack of inter-agency cooperation and collaboration 
which undermined suggestions for operational and tactical decisions to locate a Home 
Front Command for coordination and effectiveness. The pervasive graft in the security 
architecture had contributed to loss of morale among the security rank and file, resulting 
in the regular evasion of deployment to hotspots and serious lobbying for posting of 
soldiers to softer and safer areas. 
Retrieving Land Occupation 
This had been substantially successful. The government may have made an 
impressionable headway in reducing terrorist activities by Boko Haram using 
confrontation and military intelligence, but it had not effectively eliminated Boko Haram. 
The failures of these approaches could be attributed to employing policies that cannot 
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effectively address the fundamental issues of illiteracy and unemployment. Also, the 
failures of these approaches relate to the government’s inability to consistently pursue 
reorientation to counter Boko Haram’s radical narratives.  
Containment of Boko Haram 
This had been successful to some extent, however, recent upsurge in attacks 
indicate that the problem had not been effectively addressed from the root. There was 
discontentment, poverty, issue of fanaticism, indoctrination, lack of appreciation for the 
value of life and education. The failures were due to government’s inability to combine 
hard power and soft power in its effort to counter Boko Haram. The government had not 
sustained its soft power approach of deradicalization and reorientation consistently and 
effectively. There had been insincerity on the part of the government to honor its election 
campaign promises of addressing poverty in the community of the insurgents. The 
government had also failed to effectively address the welfare conditions of the people as 
well as the approach of reorientation of returning Boko Haram soldiers. Military 
containment had been ineffective because the Nigerian military was no longer as 
effective as it used to be. The military was generally viewed as unprofessional, 
unmotivated, inefficient, and plagued by low morale and high levels of corruption. The 
regional cooperation and collaboration needed from countries like Cameroon, Niger and 
Chad that share borders with Nigeria had not been forthcoming.  
Targeting and Killing 
Responses from interview participants regarding targeted killing as a 
counterterrorism strategy were mixed but a majority of participants viewed the approach 
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as ineffective. One of the responses from participants about targeted killings indicated 
that unlike what the Israel Defense Forces does in Israel, targeted killing was not 
recommended because Boko Haram soldiers were Nigerian citizens who have gone 
astray. The government’s approach should be to reorient and not to eliminate the targeted 
soldiers. Participants who had favorable views of targeted killing, argued that it had been 
effectively used by countries like Israel and the United States and, therefore, needed to be 
considered as a valid option. To be more effective, the Nigerian government should seek 
help and leverage this advanced technology. Another view suggested that targeted killing 
was not being used by the government because Boko Haram’s leader Shekau would have 
been eliminated if it was being used; a contrasting view argued that the Nigerian Air 
Force used it on a limited basis. For example, Shekau was wounded in a targeted attack. 
The prevailing view was that the government was not using targeted killing due to lack of 
credible information and the unavailability of the right tools and resources. The 
government also lacked the resources for targeted killing partly because government 
officials diverted the funds allocated for weapons towards their private use and left 
soldiers who were ill equipped to die in the battlefields.  
Furthermore, Boko Haram operatives were better than the Nigerian officials at 
collaborating and partnering with the local community and it was still holding hostages, 
including the Chibok girls, who were being used as human shields in order to discourage 
any attempts to bomb them in the forest. Targeted killing served to displace Boko Haram 
but not much else. It was only effective when the right people were identified and 
eliminated, and this required proper use of intelligence which had to be multilateral or 
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bilateral and not unilateral. The Nigerian government needed to have dossiers on 
commanders, and this was lacking. The government also needed to know the names of 
Boko Haram’s leaders, organizational structure, their sponsors and how they operate, all 
of which were lacking. Targeted killing was also impacted by the lack of cooperation 
with the neighboring countries where Boko Haram soldiers sought refuge. Effective use 
of intelligence would stop Boko Haram from crossing the borders into the neighboring 
countries after committing crimes in Nigeria.  
I summarized two types of conclusions drawn from this study in Table 2. It 
showed that of the 16 themes that emerged from the thematic analysis, three themes or 
19% were determined to be effective. These included general counterterrorism approach, 
hard power/maximum force, and reducing terrorist activities. Three of the themes or 19% 
were categorized as ongoing, had mixed results or required longer evaluation periods. 
These comprised of soft power/deradicalization/reorientation, winning hearts and 
minds/buy-in, and containment of Boko Haram. The remaining 10 themes or 63% were 
classified as ineffective. The first conclusion from this study indicated that the 
counterterrorism measures used by the Nigerian government were ineffective and, 
therefore, the government needed to device other measures in order to achieve better 
results in its counterterrorist efforts.   
 The second conclusion reflected important distinctions in the perceptions of the 
participants. Table 4 showed that the weight of positive responses by participants who 
classified general counterterrorism approach, hard power/maximum force as effective 
was negated by the weight of the negative responses by other participants, leaving 
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reducing terrorist activities as the only theme that was classified as effective. Similarly, 
the weight of fair responses by participants who classified soft 
power/deradicalization/reorientation, and containment of Boko Haram as ongoing, had 
mixed results or required longer evaluation periods was negated by the weight of other 
participants, leaving winning hearts and minds/buy-in as ongoing, had mixed results or 
required longer evaluation periods. By making these adjustments, the measures that were 
classified as ineffective decreased from three themes to one or 6%. Similarly, the 
measures that were classified as ongoing, mixed results or required longer evaluation 
periods decreased from three to one or 6% and the measures that were classified as 
ineffective increased from 10 to 14 or 88%. The second conclusion affirms the overall 
results which point to a complete failure of the counterterrorism measures employed by 
the Nigerian government against Boko Haram.  
Table 2 
 
Summary of Approaches/Themes 
Counterterrorism Approach/Theme Participant Assessment 
Effective Ineffective Ongoing 
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General counterterrorism approach P2 P1, P3,  
Hard power/maximum force P5, P8,   P1, P2, P9,   
Soft power/deradicalization/reorientation  P5, P7, P9,  P4, P6 
Commitment to develop relationships  P1, P3,   
Winning hearts and minds/Buy-in   P2 
Interagency cooperation  P2, P4, P10  
Resources for the military/military morale  P3, P9, P10  
Cooperation/collaboration with neighbors  P3, P8,   
Government sincerity and transparency  P6, P9,   
Target killings of opposition leaders  P4  
Intelligence to counteract Boko Haram  P4, P8, P9  
Reducing terrorist activities P5   
Illiteracy/unemployment/poverty/distrust  P5, P6, P7, 
P9 
 
Containment of Boko Haram  P7 P6,  
Exercising political will  P8  
Ability to block Boko Haram funding sources  P9,   
 
 
Summary 
In this chapter, I presented the data analysis and findings in response to the 
research questions, which formed the basis of the 10 interview questions to which the 
participants responded during the interviews. I developed the preliminary list of themes 
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and compared the preliminary list of themes to those that I cultivated from the 
participants’ responses to questions most closely related to the research questions and 
created a summary list of 16 themes. The summary list of themes formed the basis of the 
results of my data analysis and answered the research questions for this study.  
In response to the research question that probed the causes of failure in 
counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government in Borno State, responses by the 
participants indicated that the Nigerian government denied the gravity of the Boko 
Haram’s insurgency during the early stages. That the political denial was evidenced in a 
counterterrorism approach which participants categorized as haphazard, disjointed, 
ineffective, and uncoordinated in mitigating and addressing the fundamental causes of 
Boko Haram insurgency. Others referred to the government’s efforts as disjointed, 
unfocused, and lackluster. The participants described the government’s initial strategy to 
kill the leader as a key miscalculation because it backfired and incited many people to 
join Boko Haram, instead of the expected outcome, which was to eliminate the group, 
hence the failure of the government’s counterterrorism efforts. 
 Out of the 16 themes that emerged from the thematic analysis, I came to two 
main conclusions from the summary outlined in Table 2. In the first conclusion, three 
themes or 19% were determined to be effective. These included general counterterrorism 
approach, hard power/maximum force, and reducing terrorist activities. Three of the 
themes or 19% were categorized as ongoing, had mixed results or required longer 
evaluation periods. These comprised of soft power/deradicalization/reorientation, 
108 
 
winning hearts and minds/buy-in and containment of Boko Haram. The remaining 10 
themes or 63% were classified as ineffective.  
The first conclusion from this study indicated that the counterterrorism measures 
used by the Nigerian government were ineffective and, therefore, the government needed 
to device other measures in order to achieve better results in its counterterrorist efforts. 
The second conclusion showed important distinctions in the perceptions of the 
participants. Table 2 showed that the weight of positive responses by participants who 
classified general counterterrorism approach, hard power/maximum force as effective 
was negated by the weight of the negative responses by other participants, leaving 
reducing terrorist activities as the only theme that was classified as effective. Similarly, 
the weight of fair responses by participants who classified soft 
power/deradicalization/reorientation and containment of Boko Haram as ongoing, had 
mixed results or required longer evaluation periods was negated by the weight of other 
participants, leaving winning hearts and minds/buy-in as ongoing, had mixed results or 
required longer evaluation periods. By making these adjustments, the measures that were 
classified as ineffective decreased from three themes to one or 6%.  
Similarly, the measures that were classified as ongoing, mixed results or required 
longer evaluation periods decreased from three to one or 6% and the measures that were 
classified as ineffective increased from 10 to 14 or 88%. The second conclusion affirmed 
the overall results, which point to a complete failure of the counterterrorism measures 
employed by the Nigerian government against Boko Haram.  
109 
 
In answering the research question as to what the causes of failure in 
counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government in Borno State have been, 
responses by the participants indicated that these were multifaceted because the 
government had not been fully committed to implementing its approaches. They outlined 
the following as constituting some of the causes of failure: 
  The lack of commitment by the military to develop relationship with the 
community was partly responsible for the military’s indiscriminate response 
to attacks which caused the community to turn against them.  
 An unacceptable level of casualties in the counterterrorism efforts, which 
participants described as an indication of failure of military intelligence. Only 
recently, the military lost over 100 soldiers in an attack by Boko Haram. This 
was partly because of Boko Haram’s ability to disguise themselves in military 
uniforms and enter military barracks.  
 A lack of sincerity and transparency on the part of the government in 
truthfully communicating the results of its efforts. Participants noted that 
counterterrorism approaches have been ineffective in this regard because of a 
catalogue of disjointed incrementalism. One success recorded by the military 
was followed by multiple failures resulting from successful Boko Haram 
attacks due to unfamiliarity with the local terrain, short deployment stays and 
lack of adequate equipment.  
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  Lack of interagency cooperation and collaboration which undermined 
suggestions for operational and tactical decisions to locate a Home Front 
Command for coordination and effectiveness.  
 The pervasive graft in the security architecture had contributed to loss of 
morale among the security rank and file, resulting in the regular evasion of 
deployment to hotspots and serious lobbying for posting of soldiers to softer 
and safer areas. 
Addressing the research question whether there were alternative approaches 
considered and not used, the participants noted these to include the following:  
 To allow the states to have their own separate police force. They opined that 
this approach would give more autonomy to state governors over postings and 
deployment of the commissioner of police. This approach would be 
synergized with different quasi police formations or community policing or 
the vigilante/area watch groups to report suspicious movements and activities 
in a timely fashion. Such groups would require a clear strategy to minimize 
collateral damage.  
 To introduce a comprehensive national identification scheme that would 
identify everyone by name and residence, and make registration of place of 
new residence mandatory to monitor new arrivals or relocations. Similarly, the 
government would create a department of vital records where births, 
marriages and death were automatically registered and updated.  
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On the research question whether there were alternative approaches not 
considered at all, the participants provided these responses:  
  One of the counterterrorist approaches which was not considered at all was 
negotiating with the terrorists, at least on the surface. Similarly, the 
nonpayment of ransom poses a serious dilemma for the government, which 
follows the U.S. government that does not pay ransom as a matter of policy 
even though it was allowed.  
 The infiltration of the rank and file of Boko Haram which was extremely 
dangerous. Boko Haram was able to effectively infiltrate the Nigerian army, 
while the government hasn’t been able to do the same.  
 The government had not optimized the lessons and ideas gained from the 
multi-national workshops regarding leveraging its relationships with 
neighbors like Cameroon, Niger, Mali, and Chad. The government had done 
very little to secure better understanding and cooperation of these neighbors 
regarding insurgency.  
 The government had not made any effort to understand Boko Haram’s 
affiliation with ISIS and to solicit cooperation on how to target this group. The 
government was not making any efforts to identify those sponsoring terrorist 
organizations. The insurgents were being supported by some groups and there 
were suspicions that some of those were in the country. A lot of funding was 
coming from outside as well.  
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  The government failed to identify the sources of funding, towards finding, 
naming, shaming sponsors and punishing them. The government was not 
deploying enough resources to trace the sources of these funding in order to 
stop the inflow and deal with those sponsoring the terrorist activities. 
 A constitutional amendment to allow a state of emergency, or martial law. The 
government could legitimately declare a state of emergency, impose martial 
law and do things that it could not do in peace time. The government needed 
to realize that it was in a state of war and not deny it.  
 Targeted killing as a counterterrorist approach had not been considered. Israel 
had done that effectively against Hamas and Hezbollah and the United States 
had successfully employed this strategy against Al Qaeda.  
In conclusion, I surmise that as the review has indicated, the overall results of the 
analysis of the responses of participants provided answers to the research question, and 
indicated that the counterterrorism measures used by the Nigerian government were 
overwhelmingly ineffective because of the reasons articulated. In consequence therefore, 
I propose in this exploratory study, the need for the government to revisit the alternative 
approaches considered but not used, as well as approaches not considered at all, to device 
other measures in its counterterrorist efforts against Boko Haram.     
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to fill the gap in knowledge by 
understanding the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian 
government and exploring alternate approaches to the counterterrorism efforts in Borno 
State. I employed a qualitative study design to address the research problem and purpose. 
The counterterrorism approaches employed by the government thus far against Boko 
Haram have proved ineffective in curbing the menace of the group, averting future 
attacks, or mitigating the adverse consequences of the attacks on communities in Borno 
State. 
In view of this, I employed a qualitative research method to explore alternative 
approaches in addressing the identified problems of Boko Haram in Borno State. The 
results of this study highlighted the need for a paradigm shift by the Nigerian government 
from the current approaches for meaningful and effective changes to be seen in its fight 
against Boko Haram. Consequently, the following research questions facilitated the 
process of this inquiry:  
RQ1: What have been the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the 
Nigerian government in Borno State? 
RQ2: Were alternative approaches considered and not used or not considered at 
all? 
In all, I interviewed 10 participants who were selected through the purposeful 
sampling of senior government officers in the NPF. In the process of data collection and 
analysis, I relied mainly on interviews, my reflective journal, and my field notes. Each of 
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the interviews lasted about 60 minutes on average and were conducted at a time and 
location convenient for the participants. Follow-up questions were asked as appropriate to 
elicit further clarifying information from the participants. 
The theoretical framework that anchored this study was the contemporary 
deterrence theory by Wilner (2015). In contemporary times, deterring terrorist attacks is 
still a fundamental challenge to international security, and Nigeria is no exception; hence, 
this attempt to suggest aspects of the contemporary deterrence theory to apply in solving 
the problem of terrorism in Nigeria. The findings of this study represent a significantly 
clear contribution to knowledge of the NPF and other related agencies engaged in the 
fight against Boko Haram terrorism in Borno State and other parts of Nigeria rife with 
terrorist violence. 
In Chapter 5, I provide an interpretation of the findings by confirming or 
extending knowledge in the discipline through a discussion of peer-reviewed literature 
and by analyzing the data outcomes in the context of the conceptual framework. This 
chapter also includes a description of the limitations to trustworthiness that were 
addressed in the study and recommendations intrinsic in stimulating further research. 
Finally, in this chapter I explain the potential impact for positive social change in the 
context of counterterrorism in Nigeria and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Interpretation of Findings 
The summary Table 2 in Chapter 4 shows that the counterterrorism measures used 
by the Nigerian government were overwhelmingly ineffective, and therefore, the 
government needed to devise alternative measures in its counterterrorist efforts against 
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Boko Haram. The reasons for the failure in the government’s approach were consistent 
with what I found in the peer-reviewed literature described in Chapter 2. Innocent and 
Onyishi (2014) urged a change of approach from the tactics of extrajudicial killings 
employed by the Nigerian security agencies in dealing with the problem of Boko Haram. 
The authors added that in its brutality, this approach exacerbated increasing attacks by 
Boko Haram; hence, it was counterproductive. The findings from my study confirmed 
their finding and showed the insincerity of the government’s tactics. The government’s 
initial strategy to kill the leader was a key miscalculation because it backfired and incited 
many people who were sympathetic to the causes advocated by the group to join Boko 
Haram (see Onyishi, 2014). It also caused Boko Haram to retaliate by carrying out even 
more attacks against the military as well as innocent people who found themselves at the 
wrong place and time (Onyishi, 2014).  
The findings in this study also extended knowledge in the discipline by providing 
reasons for the failure in the government’s approach to targeted killing, which included 
the diversion of government funds allocated for weapons towards arming the soldiers in 
the fight against Boko Haram, while leaving the soldiers to die in the battlefields. This 
highlighted one of the causes of failure of counterterrorism measures by the government 
in Borno State. The ineffectiveness of targeted killing was also impacted by the lack of 
cooperation by Nigeria’s neighboring countries where Boko Haram soldiers sought 
refuge. The Nigerian government lacked good intelligence that would facilitate targeted 
killing. This finding represents a major barrier towards a collaborative intelligence effort 
by the Nigerian government with neighboring countries to fight against Boko Haram and 
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documents another cause of failure of counterterrorism measures by the government in 
Borno State. 
Additionally, Innocent and Onyishi (2014) revealed that targeted killing required 
credible information and required the right tools and resources, which the Nigerian 
government lacked. In this study, I found that the Nigerian government’s lack of good 
intelligence gave Boko Haram a significant advantage because Boko Haram operatives 
appeared better at collaborating and partnering with the local community than the 
Nigerian officials; hence, they were able to use weapons like improvised explosive 
devices to cause more damage. Boko Haram soldiers were also able to cross the borders 
easily into the neighboring countries after committing crimes in Nigeria. 
Walt (1991) expanded on the focus of previous discussions on national security 
studies centered on the use of military power, which is subject to political control. The 
results of the current study confirmed those of Walt’s by indicating that the political 
approach to the Boko Haram issue was ineffective because it failed to address the issues 
of the Northeast. There was a lack of national approach to addressing the problem of 
Boko Haram because the military and political leaderships viewed it as a regional issue 
and not a national issue. Walt also noted that military power, which was a more 
traditional approach, was not the only source of national security, and military threats 
were not the only dangers that states faced although usually the most serious (p. 213). 
Operating from the military angle, the traditional approach engaged physical force in 
deterring dangers or aggressions, emphasizing the establishment of security apparatus in 
sovereign states (Osumah, 2013). The results in this study confirmed those in the 
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literature by showing that the government’s use of military threat employed a traditional 
approach to the unconventional problems posed by Boko Haram terrorism. 
Ajayi (2012) noted the lack of progress in the efforts by the Nigeria Security 
Forces to clamp down on the magnitude and chronology of attacks by Boko Haram (p. 
104). The author also commented on the introduction of suicide bombings by Boko 
Haram in the belief of a robust reward in heaven. One of the findings from this study 
indicated that the hard measure approach by the military did not work because it was 
applicable to conventional warfare but inappropriate in an insurgency situation. I found 
that the failure of this approach was also due to a combination of factors at the national, 
regional, and multilateral levels as well as the government’s inability to effectively 
combine hard power and soft power in its effort to counter Boko Haram. Ajayi shared a 
second perspective with a focus on a nonstrategic definition emphasizing socio-economic 
factors. The findings of the current study showed discontentment, poverty, fanaticism, 
indoctrination, and lack of appreciation for the value of life and education were the result 
of the government’s inability to consistently and effectively sustain its soft power 
approach of deradicalization and reorientation. 
Osumah (2013) pointed to the two dominant approaches to the conception of 
internal security management: the traditional and modern approaches. Innocent and 
Onyishi (2014) offered that one perspective directed focus on strategic definition, which 
reflects a realist perspective conceptualizing national security in terms of self-defense and 
a dependence on the use of arms and military might to deter aggression against a state. 
The results of the current study showed that the Nigerian military relied heavily on the 
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use of arms and hard power to deter aggression against Boko Haram and that approach 
was not successful due to a lack of commitment by the military to develop relationships 
with communities and the military’s indiscriminate response to attacks, which caused 
communities to turn against them.  
In this study, I found that there were unacceptable levels of casualties in the 
counterterrorism efforts due to Boko Haram’s ability to disguise themselves in military 
uniforms and enter military barracks. This was an indication of the failure of military 
intelligence and a key reason for the failure of this approach. One of the participants 
described the failure as due to a catalogue of “disjointed incrementalism” where one 
successful attack by the military was followed by multiple failures resulting from Boko 
Haram attacks due to the government’s unfamiliarity with the local terrain, short 
deployment stays, and lack of adequate equipment. I found yet another cause of the 
failure in hard power was attributed to the lack of interagency cooperation and 
collaboration, which undermined suggestions for operational and tactical decisions to 
locate a Home Front Command for coordination and effectiveness.  
Blanchard (2014) pointed to security sector corruption and mismanagement as 
factors that left Nigerian troops with less resources and inadequately equipped to face the 
insurgency. The findings of the current study confirmed those in the literature by showing 
that these identified factors also constrained the responses of the Nigerian Security Forces 
to counter the threat posed by Boko Haram. Osumah (2013) commented that the 
diminished and degraded nature of the security agencies was one of the reasons for the 
inability of the Nigerian security agencies to contain the menace of Boko Haram. A 
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prominent finding of my study was that the pervasive graft in the security architecture 
had contributed to loss of morale among the security rank and file, resulting in the regular 
evasion of deployment to hotspots and serious lobbying for posting of soldiers to softer 
and safer areas.  
In this study, I found that the military was generally viewed as unprofessional, 
unmotivated, inefficient, and plagued by low morale and high levels of corruption. I also 
found that the Nigerian military was overwhelmed, and troop morale was low because the 
terrorists were better equipped militarily. Leaders in the military were playing politics 
and engaged in grand corruption and reckless with the lives of the Nigerian military 
troops. Military leaders need to address the issue of the diversion of funds meant for 
adequately equipping the troops in the fight against terrorism, thereby charting a new 
course in the efforts to counter the terrorist threat from Boko Haram. The government 
needs to address the pervasive issue of corruption if it hopes to offer a better alternative 
approach to counterterrorism. 
Table 3 
 
Comparison of Findings with Peer-Reviewed Literature 
 Peer 
reviewed 
New 
Finding 
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The hard measure approach by the military applicable to conventional 
warfare was inappropriate for an insurgency 
 
X 
 
Targeted killing of Boko Haram leaders exacerbated attacks X  
Need to change government’s tactics of extrajudicial killings                  X  
Government’s approach of targeted killing of Boko Haram  
leaders undermined by diversion of funds allotted for arms/weapons 
  
X 
Lack of cooperation by Nigeria’s neighboring countries where Boko 
Haram members take refuge, undermined approach of targeted killing 
  
X 
The Nigerian government lacked good intelligence to facilitate targeted 
killings 
 
X 
 
Boko Haram collaborates with the local community better than the 
Nigerian government officials 
  
X 
Lack of a national approach to addressing the problem of Boko Haram 
by the military and political leadership 
 
X 
 
Failure of government to effectively combine hard power and soft power 
approaches in its efforts to counter Boko Haram 
  
X 
Fallout of governments inconsistent and ineffective approach of 
de-radicalization and re-orientation include discontentment, poverty, 
issues of fanaticism, indoctrination, lack of appreciation of the value of 
life and education 
  
 
 
X 
Low morale of Nigerian troops due to inadequate/ineffective arms and 
weapons to counter Boko Haram 
  
X 
 
 
Limitations of the Study 
A few potential limitations to the generalizability and trustworthiness of this study 
were noted in Chapter 1. One of the possible methodological weakness identified was the 
technique employed in data collection. The use of the case study research design, a 
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purposeful sampling of 15 senior government officials in the NPF, and the eventual 
interviewing of 10 participants was the first of these limitations because the size of the 
participants may be judged by some to be too small to achieve informational saturation. 
The fact that the data involved the unique perspectives of the participants working in the 
NPF implied that there was a limitation to generalizing the results of these unique 
perspectives beyond participants in this study or similar populations.  
A second limitation is linked to the fact that participants were drawn from a 
specific agency involved in the fight against terrorism. Consequently, their knowledge of 
terrorism based on their experiences differed from other security agencies and influenced 
their responses to the questions. A third limitation is drawn from the fact that deterrence 
was merely one possibility among many within a broader spectrum of counterterrorism 
policy, and not a comprehensive solution by itself. A fourth limitation related to the 
location of participants in Nigeria. Thus, I was limited to the few days spent in Nigeria 
post data collection, to ask follow-on questions to clarify or to probe more deeply into 
their responses. A fifth limitation related to bias, and the assumption that participants 
shared their responses by answering the questions honestly and openly. However, I 
observed carefully and intently that the participants displayed genuine concern and were 
open and honest in answering the questions.  
There were no limitations to trustworthiness in the execution of this study. The 
absence of any remote or personal coercing relationship with the participants ensured that 
the findings of this study mirrored genuinely, the views of the 10 participants. I made use 
of audiotape recorder to ensure the credibility of recorded data. The process of 
122 
 
reflexibility enabled me to examine how my subjectivity as a researcher was to be 
addressed. Born and raised in in the Eastern part of Nigeria, I have lived outside of 
Nigeria for close to 20 years, although I have visited regularly. I have relied on local and 
international news media to keep abreast with the Boko Haram insurgency and I have 
managed to maintain an objective posture from the distance. During the course of this 
study, I held myself accountable to the standards of knowing and telling what I studied on 
this topic and I employed triangulation in studying the issue, compared, and cross 
checked the consistency of information I captured from my interactions with the 
participants within the few days of my stay in Nigeria after the data collection. I also set 
aside biases by asking all the participants the same questions and by carefully following 
my data collection, data processing and data analysis plan.  
I followed a six-step data analysis plan which enhanced my conformability or 
objectivity and I established audit trails to ensure that the transcriptions of the recorded 
interviews were done in two steps to allow raw data (direct transliteration) to be reviewed 
a second time to remove sentence duplications or repetitions. Finally, I used NVivo 
software to assure consistent coding. There were no risks to the participants in this study. 
Prior to the interviews, I mailed a consent form to each participant to obtain their 
permission to take part in this study. Participants’ protections were outlined in the 
consent form, and I adhered to the ethical guidelines for the study, which included 
stipulations as to the voluntary nature of participation in the study, and the right of 
participants to withdrawn from the study at any time without obligation. I read each 
participant their rights, thanked them for agreeing to participate in the study before the 
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start of the interviews and, I thanked each participant for their time, when the recorded 
interviews were completed. 
Recommendations 
The insights obtained from my research, provided the impetus for the 
recommendations that follow. This study has confirmed some of the findings of other 
peer-reviewed studies that focused on the various elements of the Boko Haram 
counterterrorism efforts. However, this study has contributed additional insights on the 
failed approaches by the Nigerian government. Hence, further research is required to 
address how these failed strategies could be enhanced to make them more successful. 
Further research that focuses on addressing a prominent finding in this study, which 
relates to the underlying issues that caused lack of buy-in by the public, will highlight 
ways the government can gain the support and cooperation of the public and thereby 
improve its intelligence capabilities through the willingness of the public to share 
information with the security agencies. The Nigerian military was generally viewed as 
unprofessional, unmotivated, inefficient, and plagued by low morale and high levels of 
corruption. Research on how the Nigerian military can realign itself to be more effective 
against counterterrorism will be helpful in expanding knowledge in this field and adding 
knowledge to this area of the discipline. The magnitude of the governments’ 
counterterrorism efforts against Boko Haram issues led to the conclusion that Nigeria is 
in a state of war that requires bold and innovative solutions to assure success. A 
comparative study of the counterterrorism efforts of Western nations versus efforts 
employed in Third World countries would be pertinent in providing insights that Nigeria 
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could benefit from in its counterterrorism efforts. Nigeria could also benefit from a 
further study to unearth the underlying reasons behind a lack of buy-in by the public in 
the Government’s efforts to combat Boko Haram.  
Implications  
Implications for Positive Social Change 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to fill the gap in knowledge by 
conducting interviews with 10 senior government officials in the NPF, to understand the 
causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government, and to 
explore alternate approaches to the counterterrorism efforts in Borno State. My research 
uncovered the ineffectiveness of the counterterrorism approaches by the Nigerian 
government due to its reliance on conventional approaches to fight unconventional threat 
of terrorism by Boko Haram. As shown in the literature review, the use of force against 
Boko Haram produced only short-term results as a palliative measure and proved very 
transient given the resurgence of Boko Haram after such attacks as more reinforced and 
fortified, and their attacks more vicious. This exploratory study about alternative 
approaches considered and not used or not considered at all, presents a positive 
conceptual advancement with a scope broader in nature, to ensure that the efforts towards 
counterterrorism are sustainable and enduring. The results of this study thus have 
implications at the individual, family, organizational, and societal level. A continuous 
threat of terrorism offers no benefit at any of the foregoing levels.  
Terrorism has the effect of occasioning losses, sorrow, and misery at the 
individual, family, organizational, and societal levels. The immediate effect at the 
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individual and family level is the untimely loss of lives which robs individuals the 
opportunity to attain full life potentials. At the organizational level the resultant effect is 
the inability of businesses to function and flourish due to the destruction of structure and 
organizational facilities from the terrorist attacks. This effect extends to the societal level 
in the form of destruction of scare infrastructures and government facilities.  
This study highlighted that attention and priority have not been given to 
alternative approaches considered but not used, as well as those not considered at all, in 
the fight against Boko Haram in Borno State. It is pivotal to embark on an urgent review 
to address this situation. The employment of deradicalization and reorientation measures 
holds a potent dynamic of an enduring and long-term approach to counterterrorism and 
addressing the problem of insurgency. This offers potential implication for a positive 
social change of highlighting the ills of terrorism and making it less attractive for 
vulnerable youths, thereby enthroning peace in the community, which in turn assures that 
individuals and families are safe to reach for their goals, organizations can thrive again 
with social infrastructure securely in place and normalcy can return to the wider society 
devoid of the destructive tendencies of terrorism.  
The impact of the Boko Haram insurgency is palpable at all levels of the Nigerian 
society. What started as a seemingly insignificant local issue caused primarily by 
economic inequalities which were exacerbated by Islamic fundamentalists who advocated 
the ills of Western education and who leveraged inaccurate teachings of the Koran, has 
steadily evolved into one of the most intractable national security issues facing Nigeria, 
and to a lesser degree, its neighboring countries. Factors such as the gross under-
126 
 
estimation of the serious nature of the Boko Haram issue, tactical and strategic mistakes 
by political and military leaders who have been roundly criticized by international 
organizations as well as dysfunctional government organizations have contributed to this 
issue.  
The poor leadership by the Nigerian government has also resulted in increased 
corruption by political and military leaders, an erosion in moral, religious, cultural and 
ethical values, an explosion in war economy due to diversion of budgeted funds, a 
general distrust of the government and a lack of buy-in by the Nigerian public. As a 
result, the potential impact of the positive social change of this study is extensive.  
 Results of finding in this study displayed in Table 2 show that the participants 
pointed to 14 of the 16 themes or approaches as ineffective. This determination also 
meant that the government needed to improve its performance in these areas. 
Consequently, my recommendations focused on the specific actions that the government 
needs to take such as increased local, regional, and international professional training of 
agency personnel in order to realize better counterterrorism outcomes. This will translate 
to a positive social change in the leadership norms and build positive moral in the 
personnel of the agencies involved in counterterrorism efforts.  
Implementing the recommendations for targeted training proffered to address the 
issues relating to high levels of corruption will ensure that the Nigerian government can 
realign itself to be more effective against counterterrorism and create a positive social 
change in not only the military leadership but in the communities it serves by curbing the 
menace of terrorism.  
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The success with offensive strikes will ensure a restoration of peace for the 
communities impacted by Boko Haram terrorism and create positive social change of 
restoring normalcy to their daily lives.  
Methodological, Theoretical, and/or Empirical Implications 
 The exploratory case study approach and the purposeful sampling method used in 
my research to interview senior government officials in the NPF, afforded a positive 
conceptual implication of understanding the causes of failure of counterterrorism 
measures against Boko Haram directly from officials involved in the fight to address this 
phenomena. The theoretical foundation for this research grounded the exploration of 
alternative approaches more suitable for countering terrorism, unlike the approaches used 
in fighting conventional wars, thereby providing formidable implication for empirical 
focus. As a result of the foregoing, no changes to the sampling, data collection, and 
analysis are recommended. 
Recommendations for Practice 
I found in this study that lack of intelligence undermined a lot of the 
government’s efforts. Boko Haram is believed to have informants in the higher echelons 
of the Nigerian government who pass on intelligence to them, while the reverse is not 
applicable for the government. Consequently, to remedy this intelligence issue, I propose 
for the government to invest in building trust and fostering human intelligence to address 
this deficiency and proactively enhance gathering intelligence on plans of attack by Boko 
Haram. Through this effort, the government can stem the flow of sensitive information to 
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Boko Haram and be more effective in its efforts to execute preemptive strikes to 
undermine Boko Haram’s aggressive attacks against innocent people.  
My research showed that by stepping up its deradicalization and reorientation 
efforts, the government could reduce religious fundamentalism, reeducate Islamists using 
positive messages from the Koran, promote the virtues of Western education, minimize 
illiteracy and promote global citizenship. I propose for the government to initiate this 
effort with utmost urgency beginning with spreading this message across at the primary 
school level and at the community level by educating the community leaders who 
embody the trust and confidence of their people to deliver these deradicalization and 
reorientation messages to members of their communities. 
I found in this study that the Nigerian military was generally viewed as 
unprofessional, unmotivated, inefficient, and plagued by low morale and high levels of 
corruption. I propose that the government invest in and increase local, regional, and 
international professional training for military personnel to expand their knowledge in the 
field of counterterrorism. This will serve to motivate them to be more efficient in the 
execution of their duties, as well build their morale and curb high level of corruption.  
The government also needs to make cooperation and collaboration with 
neighboring countries a top priority to ensure that it is getting the right support from these 
countries. To accomplish this objective, the government needs to enhance and implement 
more effectively the regional intelligence fusion unit which was established to collect 
intelligence from Nigerian agencies as well as intelligence agencies from the neighboring 
countries. Improvement in relations with Nigeria’s neighbors will also expand and 
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improve the intelligence resources and capabilities of the Nigerian military and allow the 
military to embark on offensive strikes with greater success. 
I recommend that the government adapt to local and regional cultural influences, 
by setting up panels of investigation that will identify specific issues that are unique to 
specific areas, to help the government develop more effective approaches in addressing 
those issues. The government explored the idea of establishing schools for idle youth 
where Malaams and Emirs would reorient former members of Boko Haram as a 
temporary soft power/deradicalization/reorientation approach. I propose that the 
government put plans in place to implement this initiative of engaging idle youth through 
positive local efforts as a temporary approach to address the problem and pursue a plan of 
creating employment for the youth as a long-term solution, thereby minimizing the 
likelihood of the youth to be enticed and lured by Boko Haram recruits. 
Hard power/maximum force. I recommend that the government modify its 
military approach of fighting conventional warfare to an approach that is best suited for 
counterterrorism. To do this, it needs to seek help from countries like the United States 
and Israel that have had better success with fighting Al Qaeda and Hamas terrorist 
groups. Specifically, the government needs to send special force to train with 
counterterrorism experts in Israel or the United States or request experts from the United 
States and Israel to train Nigerian troops in Nigeria. Lack of proper equipment and 
resources for the military is a political and military issue that may require better 
leadership approaches. Boko Haram has leveraged its extensive alliances with ISIS and 
other terrorist groups to gain access to funding and superior military equipment and this 
130 
 
puts the Nigerian military with inadequate equipment at a disadvantage and translates 
into very low morale.  
The government received offers from South African mercenaries to fight Boko 
Haram, but the offer was rejected. The government also considered an all-out military 
strategy like that used in Sri Lanka against the Tamil Tigers (Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam) and in Columbia against the Revolutionary Armed Forces rebels. I recommend a 
serious national debate about the extent to which these two approaches can bring about 
more lasting solutions to the Boko Haram counterterrorism challenges. Similarly, I 
recommend a national debate on the merits of a constitutional amendment to allow a state 
of emergency, or martial law. A consensus would allow the government to legitimately 
declare a state of emergency, impose martial law and pursue actions that would not be 
permissible in peace time.  
Soft power/de-radicalization/reorientation. The lack of government capacity 
and transparency in implementing instituted policies is predicated by failures in 
leadership and lack of accountability. The approach of empowerment which addressed 
the root causes of poverty and unemployment, would require years of implementation to 
prove its effectiveness. However, the deradicalization and reorientation approach 
although requires years of implementation, potentially offers a more sustainable and 
enduring solution to the intractable problem of luring new recruits by Boko Haram. The 
magnitude of the Boko Haram attacks and the governments’ counterterrorism efforts 
against Boko Haram issue leads to the conclusion that Nigeria is in a state of war that 
requires bold and innovative solutions to assure success.  
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Conclusions 
This qualitative case study bridged the gap in knowledge by conducting 
interviews with 10 senior government officials in the NPF, to understand the causes of 
failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government, and to explore alternate 
approaches to the counterterrorism efforts in Borno State.  
This research was significant because it recommended strategies to achieve 
deterrence more effectively by the Nigerian security agencies. These strategies may 
reverse the trend of ineffectiveness which characterized the government efforts so far. I 
came to two main conclusions from my analysis. My first conclusion was that the 
government needed to consider engaging in the alternative measures identified in order to 
achieve better results in its counterterrorism efforts. My second conclusion affirmed a 
complete failure of the counterterrorism measures employed by the Nigerian government 
against Boko Haram therefore the government could not continue to employ more of the 
same ineffective approaches. 
My research compared to peer-reviewed literature on Table 3, also highlighted 
several key issues which the Nigerian political and military leaders needed to address. I 
identified systemic and cultural issues of leadership, accountability and transparency 
from my research which would require tremendous will power and discipline on the part 
of the Nigerian government to address. The experts also presented a collective roadmap 
which, if followed, could yield remarkable dividends.  
There are four key takeaways from this study, the first of which is that the hard 
measure approach by the military did not work because it was applicable to conventional 
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warfare but inappropriate for an insurgency. This study showed that the Nigerian military 
relied heavily on the use of arms and hard power to deter aggression against Boko Haram 
and that approach was not successful because of a lack of commitment by the military to 
develop relationships with the communities, coupled with the military’s indiscriminate 
response to attacks which caused communities to turn against them. Therefore, the 
military should rebuild trust by developing close relationship with the communities and 
engage in more careful and targeted use of arms and hard power to minimize 
indiscriminate responses that harm innocent community members. 
The lack of community support, which represents the second takeaway from this 
study was caused by a lack of trust and transparency by a government which was 
perceived as insensitive to the basic welfare of its citizenry. This undermined the 
government’s efforts at gathering intelligence, which the communities seem willing to 
share with Boko Haram. On the other hand, Boko Haram was quick to exploit the 
government’s weaknesses and to gain the trust of the people. Boko Haram is also 
believed to have informants in the higher echelons of the Nigerian government who pass 
on intelligence to them. I propose that the government resolve through a firm and honest 
will, to address the intelligence issue, by identifying and prosecuting Boko Haram 
informants among government agencies, to stem the flow of sensitive information to 
Boko Haram and enhance efforts to execute preemptive strikes to undermine Boko 
Harams aggressive attacks against innocent people.  
The third takeaway from this study is that by stepping up its deradicalization and 
reorientation efforts, the government could reduce religious fundamentalism, reeducate 
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Islamists using positive messages from the Koran, promote the virtues of Western 
education, minimize illiteracy, create employment opportunities, and promote global 
citizenship. The fourth takeaway is that the pervasive graft in the security architecture has 
contributed to loss of morale among the security rank and file, resulting in the regular 
evasion of deployment to hotspots and serious lobbying for posting of soldiers to softer 
and safer areas. The government should address this situation by implementing heavy 
discipline of senior officials found culpable, to rebuild morale and credibility of the 
security personnel. 
The view of the military as unprofessional, unmotivated, inefficient, and plagued 
by low morale and high levels of corruption, translated into devaluing the lives of the 
Nigerian military, the government cannot allow this to continue or the risk of negatively 
impacting every facet of the Nigerian society continues. In this exploratory study, I 
propose the adoption and implementation of deradicalization and reorientation as 
important practical and enduring approaches to the counterterrorism challenges in 
Nigeria, which could serve as important blueprint for such activities within the African or 
Third World context. However, this exploratory study leads me to conclude that not 
much will change unless the government is willing and resolved to make the paradigm 
shift necessary to confront all the enterprises benefiting from the ineffective system. 
More remains to be done to assure better comprehensive and lasting successes.  
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Appendix A: Boko Haram Killings 
Serial 
No. 
Date Location Incident Fatality 
     
 July 26-29, 
2009 
Bauchi, Maiduguri, 
Potiskum, Wudil 
Boko Haram uprising 1000+ killed 
 July 30, 2009 Maiduguri Capture of Mohammed Yusuf Mohammed 
Yusuf executed 
 September 7, 
2010 
Bauchi Prison break by suspected 
Boko Haram gunmen 
5 killed, 721 
inmates 
released 
 December 31, 
2010 
Abuja Bomb attack outside a 
barracks 
4 killed 
 May 29, 2011 Abuja, Bauchi Bomb explosions during 
swearing in of President 
Goodluck Jonathan 
15 killed 
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No. 
Date Location Incident Fatality 
 June 16, 2011 Nigerian Police 
Headquarters 
Abuja 
First suicide bombing in 
Nigeria 
Failed attempt, 
2 killed 
 August 26, 
2011 
United Nations 
Compound Abuja 
Bombing attack 21 killed 
 November 4, 
2011 
Damaturu: Police 
station, churches, 
banks 
Car bombing, shootings, 
suicide bombings 
100-150 killed 
 December 22-
23, 2011 
Maiduguri, 
Damaturu 
Clash between Nigerian 
security forces and Boko 
Haram 
7 soldiers and 
50 militants 
killed 
 December 25, 
2011 
Madalla, Jos, 
Gadaka, Damaturu 
Suicide bombings, bombings, 
shootings at churches. 
41+ Christians 
killed 
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No. 
Date Location Incident Fatality 
 January 5-6, 
2012 
Mubi, Yola, 
Gombi, Maiduguri 
Shootings at Christian 
churches and businesses, 
Police stations, Immigration 
offices and State Security local 
branch office 
37+ killed 
 January 20, 
2012 
Kano State Shootings at Christian 
churches and business 
32 Police 
officers and 
150 civilians 
killed 
 April 8, 2012 Kaduna Suicide car bombing at 
Christian church on Easter day 
38 killed 
 June 17, 2012 Kaduna Bomb attacks at Christian 
churches 
12-19 killed 
 August 7, 
2012 
Kogi State Mass shooting at Deeper Life 
Bible Church 
19 killed 
 December 25, 
2012 
Maiduguri, 
Potiskum 
Spree shooting, arson on 
Christian churches 
27 killed 
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No. 
Date Location Incident Fatality 
 March 18, 
2013 
Kano Suicide attacks, car bombings 
of Christian civilians at bus 
station 
22-65 killed 
 April 16, 2013 Borno State  Mass killing, spree killing, 
petrol bombing 
200+ killed 
 July 6, 2013 Yobe State School shooting, terrorism, 
mass murder 
42 killed 
 August 12, 
2013 
Maiduguri Attack at Mosque 56 killed 
 September 12, 
2013 
Borno State Ambush 40 soldiers 
killed 
 September 12-
18 
Borno State Offensive by Nigerian Army 150 Islamist 
and 16 soldiers 
killed 
 September 18, 
2013 
Borno State Massacre 159 killed 
 September 29, 
2013 
Yobe State Gunmen at College of 
Agriculture  
44 students and 
teachers killed 
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No. 
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 October 29, 
2013 
Damaturu Raid 128 killed 
 January 14, 
2014 
Maiduguri Bombing 30 killed 
 January 26, 
2014 
Borno State, 
Adamawa State 
Slaying and shooting in a 
village in Borno and Catholic 
church in Adamawa 
138 killed 
 February 14, 
2014 
Borno State Massacre against Christian 
villagers 
121 killed 
 February 15, 
2014 
Izghe, Borno State Massacre against villagers 105 killed 
 February 25, 
2014 
Yobe State School massacre 59 killed 
 April 14, 2014 Abuja Twin bombing at Nyanya 
motor park bus station 
88+ killed 
 April 14-15, 
2014 
Borno State Abduction of female students 
at a Government Secondary 
School Chibok 
276 missing 
 May 1, 2014 Abuja Car bomb 19 killed 
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No. 
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 May 5, 2014 Borno State Shooting and arson in twin 
towns of Gamboru and Ngala 
300 killed 
 May 20, 2014 Jos Car bomb in the city of Jos 180 killed 
 May 27, 2014 Yobe State Attack at Police and Military 
bases 
49 security 
personnel and 9 
civilians killed 
 May 30, 2014 Borno State  Ambush in Gwoza 3rd Emir of 
Gwoza killed 
 June 1, 2014 Adamawa State Bomb in Mubi 40 killed 
 June 2, 2014 Borno State Slaughtering massacre of 
mostly Christians in several 
villages 
200+ killed 
 June 20-30, 
2014 
Borno State Attacks and Kidnap 70 killed, 91 
women and 
children 
kidnapped 
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No. 
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 June 23-25, 
2014 
Abuja, Kaduna 
State 
Shooting, bombing 171 killed 
 July 22, 2014 Borno State  Massacre in Chibok 51 killed 
 September19, 
2014 
Borno State Massacre in the market 30 killed 
 November 3-
10, 2014 
Yobe State Suicide bombing 15 Shiites and 
46 students 
killed 
 November 25, 
2014 
Borno State Suicide bombing 45+ killed 
 November 28, 
2014 
Kano State Suicide bombing 120 Muslim 
followers of the 
Emir of Kano 
killed 
 December 1, 
2014 
Borno State Female suicide bomber at a 
crowded market 
5 killed 
 December 10, 
2014 
Kano State Female suicide bomber near a 
market 
4 killed 
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No. 
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 December 13, 
2014 
Borno State Kidnapping in Gumsuri 
village 
32-35 killed, 
172-185 
women and 
children 
kidnapped 
 December 22, 
2014 
Gombe State Bombing at bus station in 
Gombe city 
27 killed 
 December 28-
29, 2014 
Cameroon Attacks on civilian and 
military positions 
84 killed 
 January 3-7, 
2015 
Borno State Attacks on military base and 
Baga village, mass killing and 
petrol bombing 
150+ killed, 
over 2000 
uncounted for 
 January 10, 
2015 
Maiduguri 10-year old female suicide 
bomber at a market 
19 killed plus 
bomber 
 January 11, 
2015 
Yobe State 2 female bombers 10-years 
old, at a market in Potiskum  
3 killed plus 
bombers 
 January 24, 
2015 
Maiduguri Gunmen attempted to burn 
Kambari village 
15 killed  
 January 28, 
2015 
Adamawa State Attacks and rampage 40 killed 
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 February 6, 
2015 
Niger Raids in Bosso and Diffa 
towns, first attacks in the 
country 
5 killed 
 February 15, 
2015 
Yobe Suicide bomber in city of 
Damaturu 
16 killed 
 February 20, 
2015 
Borno State Attacks across the state and 
Chibok town 
34 killed, 21 in 
Chibok 
 February 24, 
2015 
Yobe & Kano 
States 
Suicide bomber in Potiskum 
and Kano 
27 killed 
 February 25, 
2015 
Biu and Jos Attacks 35 killed 
 March 7, 2015 Maiduguri Five suicide bomb blasts 54 killed, Boko 
Haram 
formally 
declares 
allegiance to 
Islamic State 
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 March 28, 
2015 
Gombe State Attacks by gunmen at polling 
center of Nigerian’s general 
election 
15 killed 
including 
House of 
Assembly 
candidate 
 April 5, 2015 Borno State Attacks Kwafaja village by 
militants dressed like 
preachers 
24 killed 
 April 9, 2015 Borno State  Attacks in Dile village 20 killed 
 April 17, 2015 Borno State Attacks during military 
evacuation of Gwoza town 
12 killed by 
slitting throat 
 April 21, 2015 Borna State Mines and fire rocket attacks 
during military evacuation of 
Baga town 
8 soldiers and 1 
civilian killed 
 June 16, 2015 Chad Twin suicide bomb attacks in 
capital city N’Djamena, first 
in the city 
24 killed 
 June 22, 2015 Bauchi 2 young female suicide 
bombers 
30 killed 
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 July 1-2, 2015 Bornu State Attacks at multiple Mosques 
in Kukawa 
48 men and 
boys killed on 
the 1st, 97 men 
killed on the 
2nd.  
 July 5, 2015 Yobe State Suicide attack at a church in 
Potiskum 
5 killed 
 July 6, 2015 Jos 2 bomb attacks 44 killed 
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol 
Date:____________________________ 
Location:_________________________ 
Name of 
Interviewer:_______________________________________________________ 
Name of 
Interviewee:_______________________________________________________ 
Interview Questions:  
1. How would you describe the current counter-terrorism approaches by the 
Nigerian government against Boko Haram? 
2. How effective have these approaches been in combating terrorist acts by Boko 
Haram, if not, what are the causes of failure of these measures? 
3. What other alternative approaches have been considered and not used?  
4. What other possible alternative measures have not been considered at all? 
5. How has the Nigerian government used threats of punishment to influence 
Boko Haram? 
6. What ways can the Nigerian government delegitimize Boko Haram in the 
Nigerian sociocultural system to bring them to the negotiating table? 
7. What are your thoughts about targeted killings as a strategy that the Nigerian 
government can use against Boko Haram? 
8. How can the Nigerian government target sponsors of Boko Haram to 
undermine terrorist activities by the group? 
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9. What are the most important values that the Nigerian government can exploit 
as tools to hinder Boko Haram’s activities? 
10. How can the Nigerian government thwart efforts by Boko Haram to regroup 
and intensify future attacks after a counter-terrorism effort against the group? 
